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Abstract 
The author examines the environmental regulatory regime in the Mackenzie Valley 
region of the Northwest Territories which includes the regulatory structure 
established by the Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act and the private 
contractual instruments of environmental agreements, impact benefit agreements and 
socio-economic agreements. The author concludes that these instruments work 
together to form a complex regulatory system that is sometimes maladapted to the 
adaptive management framework necessary for effective regulation in an increasingly 
unstable arctic environment. The author argues that effective environmental 
management in the Mackenzie Valley requires a regulatory approach grounded in 
principled flexibility and shared environmental goals across a multiplicity of 
instruments. The Mackenzie Valley region is better suited than other regions to 
develop this approach due to its history of integrated resource management and co-
management with Aboriginal people and because of the protections provided to 
Aboriginal rights by Section 35 of the Canadian constitution. 
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Resource management; environmental regulation; resilience theory; adaptive 
management; Mackenzie Valley; co-management; impact benefits agreements; 
socio-economic agreements; environmental agreements, climate change.  
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CHAPTER 1 
1 Introduction 
“First Nations are Canadians last, best hope of protecting the land, 
water, sky and plants and animals for their future generations as 
well.”1 
 
The Canadian arctic is one of the most enigmatic regions on earth.  This thesis 
focuses on the challenges of environmental regulation in northern Canada and 
suggests that some of the strategies developed in the arctic regions, particularly in 
the Mackenzie Valley region of the Northwest Territories (NWT), have the potential 
to assist regulators south of the 60th parallel. 
 
This thesis accepts that climate change is a true environmental and social challenge, 
and the effects of climate change are felt disproportionately in the arctic.  In 2004, 
the Ministers of the Arctic Council, an international body made up of representatives 
from arctic nations, released the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA).2  More 
than 250 scientists and six circumpolar Indigenous peoples organizations 
participated in the ACIA, and the results of the study are disconcerting.  
 
The ACIA confirmed that the arctic climate is warming rapidly, and that this is likely 
to result in large scale environmental consequences with global implications.  This 
includes large scale and irreversible changes to the arctic terrain including shifting 
arctic vegetation zones with forests replacing existing tundra and tundra vegetation 
moving into polar deserts;  Melting permafrost will significantly alter existing 
wetlands.  The ACIA predicted significant changes in animal species’ diversity, 
                                                        
1 Dr. Pam Palmater as quoted by Wab Kinew in his essay “Idle No More is Not Just an Indian Thing” 
reproduced in John Ralston Saul, The Comeback (Toronto: Penguin Canada Books, 2014) at 252. 
2 AMAB, Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). The 
members of the Arctic Council are Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and 
the United States. Permanent Indigenous participants include the Aleut International Association, 
Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian 
Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and the Saami Council. 
2 
 
 
 
ranges and distribution.  In particular, the ACIA identified a major decline in arctic 
marine species such as polar bears, seals, walrus and some marine birds.  Elevated 
ultraviolet radiation levels will affect people, plants and animals.  The ACIA also 
noted that climate change is likely to have major economic and cultural impacts for 
Indigenous communities living in the Arctic.3  Since the release of the ACIA, the 
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) associated with the Arctic 
Council have released related studies that support these findings.4  These findings 
inform and are consistent with scientific studies done by the Government of the 
Northwest Territories.5  
 
Of particular importance to the Dene people in the Mackenzie Valley is the rapid 
decline of the caribou population. The caribou herd is a key source of sustenance 
and cultural meaning to the Dene people.6 The importance of caribou is described by 
the Sahtu Dene as follows:  
“If one thing could be singled out that binds the people of DA@line most strongly to 
their land and heritage, it would be caribou. Many traditional stories show the 
wisdom and character of the caribou. The caribou have always been a staple of Dene 
subsistence and its seasonal migrations have determined people’s movements on 
the land.” 7  
 
All of these factors, including the decline of the caribou, are irrevocably altering the 
physical and social landscape of the north.  This thesis looks at strategies for 
                                                        
3 AMAB, Arctic Climate Impact Assessment –Executive Summary (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005) at 10-11. 
4 AMAP released in 2015: (1) Freshwater Systems in a Changing Climate and (2) Human Health in the 
Arctic and in 2016: (1) Methane as an Arctic Climate Forcer and (2) Black Carbon and Ozone as an 
Arctic Climate Forcer which are available on their website at www.amap.no . 
5 In 2008, the Government of the Northwest Territories released its Climate Change Report. That 
Report relies heavily on the findings in the ACIA and notes that the climate change impacts identified 
in the NWT report are consistent with the ACIA. GNWT, NWT Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation 
Report (2008) available online at 
www.enr.gov.nt.ca/sites/default/reports/nwt_climate_change_impacts_and_adaptation_report.pdf at 
6. 
6 Liv Solveig Vors and Mark Stephen Boyce, “Global Declines of Caribou and Reindeer” (2009) 15 Global 
Change Biology 11 at 2626-2633; For a discussion of the cultural importance of caribou to the Tlicho Dene 
see Allice Legat “Walking the Land, Feeding the Fire: Knowledge and Stewardship Among the Tlicho 
Dene” (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2012) at 83-85. 
7 Taken from their website of the Deline First Nation at www.deline.ca/culture-and-
community/deline-stories/importance-of-caribou (2016). 
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effective environmental regulation in a unique and challenging time characterized 
by uncertainty of the natural and social world.   It argues that the status given to 
Aboriginal and Treaty rights under Section 35 of the Constitution provides 
additional environmental protections that will be important in fighting climate 
change, and that supporting and enabling Aboriginal people to exercise their 
traditional role in stewardship of the land is an important component in 
encouraging effective and resilient environmental management. 
 
This thesis examines the regulatory regime operating in the Mackenzie Valley region 
of the Northwest Territories and its ability to effectively regulate a “new north” 
characterized by environmental and social instability.  It defines the regulatory 
regime to include both the environmental legislative scheme, predominately the 
Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act (MVRMA) 8 and its related co-
management board structures, and contractual agreements. The types of 
contractual agreements reviewed in this paper are environmental agreements that 
are directly concerned with environmental impacts, impact benefit agreements that 
are designed to flow benefits from development to the impacted Aboriginal groups, 
and socio-economic agreements that are intended to flow benefits and address 
impacts for all Northerners.  
 
Academic literature on the regulatory regime in the Mackenzie Valley is divided into 
two discernible themes: (1) those who see the primary role of contractual 
agreements as addressing deficiencies in the Northern regulatory system, and (2) 
those who see the primary role of contractual agreements as increasing public 
participation in northern decision-making.  Both these schools characterize the 
contractual agreements as augmenting or detracting from the existing regulatory 
system.  
 
Members of the first school,  Galbraith, Bradshaw and Rutherford conclude that 
                                                        
8 S.C. 1998, c.25. 
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contractual agreements in the Mackenzie Valley deliberately fill the gap and address 
the failings in the design and practice of the environmental assessment regime. 
These agreements create legally binding enforcement mechanisms for outstanding 
issues that otherwise lack a regulatory home. The agreements address mistrust by 
promoting cooperation and committing parties to establishing business 
relationships; they address capacity issues by ensuring that the government does 
not bear the entire financial burden of the increased demand on social and 
environmental services; and they address benefit related issues and support 
economic development.9 Affolder likewise argues that the value of environmental 
agreements is to allow parties to address deficiencies in the system in 
circumstances where there is no political will to address through other avenues.10  
 
Several authors express concern that contractual agreements can undermine the 
environmental assessment process. Fidler and Hitch argue that the environmental 
assessment process is more transparent and better equipped to address both public 
interest issues and the interests of Aboriginal groups than private contractual 
agreements.11 Klein, Donihee and Stewart highlight the tension and possible overlap 
between the role of public government in addressing socio-economic matters 
through public processes and private negotiated agreements that also address the 
socio-economic impacts for the Aboriginal population. They conclude that the two 
processes (impact benefit agreements and economic impact assessment) can be 
complimentary provided that the regulator is able to develop a solid socio-economic 
impact assessment practice that could inform IBA negotiations.12 
 
The second group of theorists focus on the role of contractual agreements in 
                                                        
9 Lindsay Galbraith, Ben Bradshaw and Murray B Rutherford, “Towards a New Supra-Regulatory 
Approach to Environmental Assessment in Northern Canada” (March 2007) 25(1) Impact Assessment and 
Project Appraisal 27 
10 Natasha Affolder “Rethinking Environmental Contracting” (2013) 21 JELP 156 (WL).  
11 Courtney Fidler and Michael Hitch, “Impact Benefit Agreements: A Contentious Issue for 
Environmental and Aboriginal Justice “ (2007) 35(2) Environmental Journal 49 (QL).  
12 Heidi Klein, John Donihee and Gordon Stewart, “Environmental Impact Assessment and Impact 
Benefit Agreements: Creative Tension or Conflict ? (2005) available online at 
www.impactandbenefit.com/Research. 
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increasing public participation in Northern decision-making.  Lucas focuses on 
“bridging practices” which are processes that move participants further along the 
spectrum from procedural rights of participation to actual participation in the 
decision-making process.   There is a key difference between administrative rights, 
which allow for participation within a defined system that may not be amenable to 
the types of actual outcomes being sought by the Aboriginal groups and the ability 
to determine actual outcomes.  He argues that the co-management regime in the 
Mackenzie Valley is an example of a bridging practice that enhances local 
participation and accountability in the operation of the resource management 
process, but still does not give Aboriginal groups the right to determine the 
substantive outcome.   The right to determine substantive outcomes may not be 
appropriate in all circumstances but it is more desirable in circumstances where 
Aboriginal groups are rightsholders and the key impacts will be felt on their 
traditional territory.  Lucas argues that impact benefit agreements are one of the 
few instruments that secure substantive decision-making rights for Aboriginal 
people. In that way, they augment the existing system and create greater 
participatory rights.13  
 
Graben similarly notes the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board 
consciously promotes increased collaboration between Aboriginal groups and 
industry and encourages the use of private agreements to give communities a 
greater participation in the licensing process.14 Both Graben and Lucas express 
concern regarding the limitations of addressing social needs through private 
contract where resorting to private contractual agreements could undermine the 
public process.  
 
This academic work provides useful insights into the regulatory system but is 
                                                        
13 Alastair R. Lucas, “Canadian Participatory Rights in Mining and Energy Development: The Bridges 
to Empowerment” in Donald N. Zillman, Alastair R. Lucas and George (Rock) Pring, eds, Human Rights 
in Resource Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 305. 
14 Sari M. Graben, “Assessing Stakeholder Participation in Sub-Arctic Co-Management: 
Administrative Rule Making and Private Agreements” (2011) 29 Windsor YB Access Just. 195 (QL). 
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limited by the tendency to view the contractual arrangements as “add-ons” to the 
MVRMA legislative regime with the capacity to either augment or undermine those 
environmental goals. This thesis demonstrates that that the regulatory regime in the 
Mackenzie Valley operates as a complex system. Various parts of the regulatory 
system interact with each other in ways that are sometimes complimentary and at 
other times conflicting. The regulatory regime in the Mackenzie Valley is more 
adaptive and promotes greater resilience because of the complex interaction 
between the legislative scheme established under the Mackenzie Valley Resource 
Management Act, contractual agreements and Aboriginal Law.  
 
This thesis is ultimately concerned with how to most effectively regulate 
development in the Mackenzie Valley given the challenges of climate change. A 
central argument made in this thesis is that the adaptive capacity of the regime 
would be strengthened if the multiplicity of 
stakeholders/rightsholders/regulators15 in the Mackenzie Valley were guided by 
better articulated environmental goals and an environmental vision.  
 
 Central to this thesis is a lengthy review of several key theories of regulatory 
governance. These theories of regulatory governance are instrumental in 
understanding how the regulatory regime in the Mackenzie Valley functions to 
promote adaptive management, with the insights provided by responsible 
regulation theory, new governance theory, and resilience theory being particularly 
helpful. This paper is heavily influenced by the resilience theorists and their focus 
                                                        
15 In this paper, I have used rightsholders to refer to Aboriginal groups who have Aboriginal and 
Treaty rights that are protected under Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution and stakeholders to 
refer to other interested parties, both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, whose interests would not be 
constitutionally protected. The extent to which Aboriginal groups should be dealt with as 
rightsholders as opposed to stakeholders is the subject of debate both domestically and 
internationally. See Sara L. Seck, “Indigenous Rights, Environmental Rights, or Stakeholder 
Engagement? Comparing IFC and OECD Approaches to Implementation of the Business 
Responsibility to Respect Human Rights” (2016) 12:1 McGill Journal of International Sustainable 
Development and Practice , forthcoming. Professor Seck makes a convincing argument for a broad 
definition of Aboriginal rights. This is advocated because of the vulnerability of Aboriginal peoples to 
development, and the gap created because the Canadian constitution does not recognize 
environmental rights as a separate and protected category of rights. 
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on the promotion of flexibility, adaptability and the fostering of resilience in a non-
stationary environment.  
 
This paper is divided into four Parts.  Part one is a review of the theories of 
regulatory governance that may provide useful guidance on how to build a more 
adaptive and resilient regulatory regime in the Mackenzie Valley. 
 
Part two discusses the importance of the Mackenzie Valley Resource Management 
Act (MVRMA) as the primary statute addressing the regulation of land and water in 
the Mackenzie Valley as well as the interaction of the MVRMA with Aboriginal law. 
This involves a review of both primary sources and academic sources. 
 
Part Three examines the three types of contractual agreements most often utilized 
for resource development projects in the north. These are (1) impact benefit 
agreements, (2) socio-economic agreements, and (3) environmental agreements. I 
rely extensively on a review of the literature in discussing the environmental 
agreements associated with the Ekati, Diavik, and Snap Lake diamond mines. The 
discussion of environmental agreements associated with the Gahcho Kue Mine and 
Giant Mine Remediation Project is based on primary sources including the 
documents filed with the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board. 
The section on impact benefit agreements and socio-economic agreements is based 
predominantly on a literature review because impact benefit agreements are 
confidential agreements and largely unavailable.  
 
Part Four analyzes how the regulatory regime in the Mackenzie Valley operates as a 
complex system, and identifies some of the characteristics of the regulatory regime 
which allows the components to work together to promote a more adaptive and 
resilient system.  
 
This thesis highlights the reasons why the environmental regime in the Mackenzie 
Valley has the potential to provide a more adaptive and resilient model for 
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environmental regulation. These include: (1) the Mackenzie Valley Resource 
Management Act is an integrated resource management scheme and is less likely to 
compartmentalize environmental and social effects; (2) a focus on co-management 
allows it to incorporate different perspectives and world views, especially 
Aboriginal perspectives16; (3) links to Aboriginal law and the modern land claims 
process makes the scheme less susceptible to political pressure and to the legal 
pressure to conform to administrative law principles which are often incompatible 
with adaptive management; and (4) contract law is used to augment the regulatory 
system in ways that often (although not always) builds in more flexibility and 
provides for additional input by Aboriginal peoples.  
 
The key piece missing for effective environmental management in the Mackenzie 
Valley is principled flexibility. Principled flexibility allows for stronger, legally 
enforceable and institutionally supported goals with more flexibility on how to 
achieve these goals.17 Environmental and Aboriginal groups in the Mackenzie Valley 
do not share a sufficiently strong environmental and social purpose that is capable 
of sustaining an adaptive environmental governance system across a multiplicity of 
regulatory instruments. Without this underlying coordinating framework, the 
northern regulatory regime may become a jumble of legal and policy instruments 
with an unfortunate tendency towards over-bureaucratization. However, I am 
convinced that the regulatory regime in the north has the ability to transform 
environmental regulation when this final piece of principled flexibility is enabled.  
  
                                                        
16 Co-management is defined as the sharing of management power and responsibility between the 
government and local resource users. See F. Berkes, P. George and R. Preston, “Co-Management” (1991) 
18(2) Alternatives 12 at 12. In the Mackenzie Valley, this involves power sharing with the Aboriginal 
people who are the primary resource users on their traditional territories. 
17 Robin Kundis Craig and Melinda Harm Benson. “Symposium: The Next Generation of 
Environmental and Resources Law: What has changed in Forty Years and What Needs to Change as a 
Result: Replacing Sustainability” (2013) 46 Akron LR 841 at 877. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2 Regulatory Theory 
Regulatory theory and its role in resource development has been a topic of much 
academic discussion particularly since the late 1960s and 1970s, which saw both a 
growing awareness of environmental issues, and the rise and increasing complexity 
of the administrative state.  Some of the major schools of thought providing insight 
into modes of environmental governance are outlined below.  Ultimately, these 
schools of thought are not mutually exclusive and a successful regulatory system 
should draw insights from all. This paper pays particular attention to the resilience 
theory, which argues that adaptive management must be an integral part of any 
attempt to regulate complex environmental problems and is particularly compelling 
given the undeniable reality of climate change and the unpredictability of the 
current arctic environment.  
 
2.1 Command and Control Regulation 
Command and Control regulation starts from the premise that governments have 
the ability to command through law, and that they are then authorized to control the 
behavior of others through enforcement of those commands. Agencies are 
responsible for establishing prescriptive environmental standards, monitoring 
compliance with those standards and enforcing punitive sanctions for their 
violation.  
 
Command and Control is a vital element of any regulatory system particularly in 
circumstances where it is important for government to establish and enforce 
environmental bottom lines or where you have insufficient corporate compliance. 
Historically, command and control regulation has been very successful in addressing 
pressing environmental issues that were amenable to this type of “big stick” 
approach. For example, this type of regulatory approach has been quite successful in 
10 
 
 
 
dealing with air and water pollution in situations where it has targeted point-source 
pollution and waste disposal practices.18  
 
Command and Control is a centralized system of regulation, and has been criticized 
for its “one size fits all” approach. Critics of command and control regulation argue 
that it is not suitable for managing large scale and complex environmental problems 
such as climate change. These types of complex problems require holistic, 
integrated, and at the same time localized eco-system approaches. This can be 
difficult to reconcile with command and control mechanisms that are centralized 
and designed to address a particular problem, without addressing the complex 
interactions that occur within eco-systems. Complex problems are not amenable to 
top-down solutions imposed by governments and usually require solutions that are 
more decentralized and sensitive to local and changing conditions.19  
 
Another key criticism of command and control regulation is its adversarial in 
nature. It has as a primary focus the imposition of penalties for non-compliance. 
This can provoke unproductive resistance from individuals and businesses rather 
than fostering a more collaborative approach to environmental management. The 
result is a system that is inefficient to operate and overly bureaucratic.20 
 
2.2  Deregulation 
Deregulation theorists argue that current environmental regulation is excessive and 
hinders economic development. They argue that market forces can achieve 
desirable environmental outcomes as long as the market is properly constituted and 
the appropriate economic incentives are in place.  
 
                                                        
18 J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management – Is it Possible? (2005)7 Minn J.L. Sci. & Tech. 21 
(2005). 
19 Cameron Holley, Neil Gunningham and Clifford Shearing. The New Environmental Governance (New 
York: Earthscan, 2012) at 2. 
20 Ibid at 2. 
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Rosenbloom contends that environmental degradation occurs because the 
environment is not appropriately valued in the market place. There is an economic 
disconnect because the environment is seen as a “common pool” resource that is 
available for depletion without the costs of that depletion being given appropriate 
economic weight.21 Once environmental degradation is factored in as a cost of 
production, then market forces will correct this harm without the need for excessive 
regulation. Attempts to factor in environmental costs include pollution taxes such as 
“Cap and Trade” schemes that limit the amount of pollution that the state will 
authorize and makes the right to pollute an economically valuable and tradable 
commodity.  
 
There are environmental costs to development and, if they are not acknowledged 
and factored in appropriately, those costs are often absorbed by the most vulnerable 
people in society. However, deregulation is often advanced in order to promote 
economic development through “smaller government”. This paper demonstrates 
that the presence of a strong regulator (although not necessarily more rules) is key 
to a strong environmental management regime in the Mackenzie Valley. 
 
 
2.3 Responsive Regulation 
 
This is a variation of the command and control model that allows and encourages 
corporate responsibility within a narrowly defined and heavily scrutinized 
environment. It has been an influential theory of environmental regulation since  
1992 when Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite published their seminal work entitled 
Responsive Regulation: Transcending the De-regulation Debate.22  
 
                                                        
21 Jonathan Rosenbloom. “Defining Nature as a Common Pool Resource” in Ken Hirokawa ed, 
Environmental Law and Contrasting Ideas of Nature (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 47-
63. 
22 Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1992). 
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Braithwaite and Ayres propose a regulatory pyramid model. At the base of the 
pyramid is the more restorative, dialogue-based approach to ensuring compliance. 
As regulated parties move up the sanctions pyramid, increasingly more demanding 
interventions are involved. All parties understand that the ultimate sanctions 
available to the regulator are formidable. However, these sanctions are only used as 
a last resort if other approaches aimed at increasing the internal capacity of the 
regulated actors to resolve the issue are either unsuccessful or not feasible.23 
Affolder describes responsive regulation as an ongoing process of moves and 
counter-moves fine tuned to the individual actors involved and their conduct. 24  
 
Braithwaite and Ayers argue that regulated actors see this type of regulatory model 
as more legitimate and procedurally fair and therefore compliance with the law is 
more likely. They contend that this system is more strategic and therefore less 
susceptible to system capacity overload.25  
 
Barton holds that responsible regulation is transformative as it creates space for 
more than just the regulator and the regulated. The role of the concerned public can 
move from a peripheral role seeking to interpose itself in the relationship between 
government and the regulated agency into a more central part of the regulatory 
scheme.26 
 
Braithwaite’s more recent work places increased emphasis on the importance of 
networking in the regulatory process. Braithwaite recognizes that public actors can 
play a significant role in placing pressure on the non-compliant. He identifies banks 
as powerful networking partners who are able to exert significant control over the 
                                                        
23 Ibid. at 42. 
24 Natasha Affolder, “Why Study Large Projects? Environmental Regulation’s Neglected Frontier” (2011) 
44 UBC L Rev. 521-55 at paragraph 2-3.  
25 Ayres and Braithwaite, Supra, note 22. 
26 Barry Barton, “Underlying Concepts and Theoretical Issues in Public Participation in Resource 
Development” in Donald N. Zillman, Alastair R. Lucas and George (Rock) Pring, eds. Human Rights in 
Resource Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) 77 at 110. 
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regulated.27 The current focus on social license, or the securing of community 
support as a prerequisite to development would also fall into this networking 
category. Affolder argues that this focus on networking may be overstated because 
of the divergent interests of networking partners, many of whom are single interest 
focused and may work at cross purposes with the regulator. 28 For example, banks 
are primarily concerned with protecting their financial investment. They want 
finality in decision-making, which can work at cross-purposes with adaptive 
management. 
 
This thesis demonstrates that the presence of a strong regulator in the Mackenzie 
Valley resource management boards, and the threat that the Boards will impose 
mitigations on proponents in the event that they fail to reach agreements with 
stakeholders/rightsholders is key to the effectiveness of the Mackenzie Valley 
regulatory regime. 
 
2.4 Dynamic Federalism 
 
Dynamic federalism is a reaction against the prevailing American economic theory 
that there is an optimal level of government involvement to regulate any problem 
such that efficient regulation can only occur when the regulating entity fully 
internalize the costs and benefits of its policies. This has often been referred to as 
the “matching principle” and holds that regulatory authority should reside at the 
level of government that roughly matches the geographic scope of the problem so 
that national environmental issues are dealt with at the federal level and regional 
environmental issues are dealt with at the state or local level.29 
 
                                                        
27 John Braithwaite, “The Essence of Responsive Regulation” (2011) 44 UBC LR 475 (QL) at 51 and 52. 
28 Natasha Affolder, “Why Study Large Projects? Environmental Regulation’s Neglected Frontier” (2011) 
44 UBC L Rev. 521-55 at 521.  
29 David E Adelman and Kirsten H. Engel “Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating 
Environmental Regulatory Authority” (2008) Minnesota Law Review 1796 at 1798. 
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Dynamic federalism explicitly calls for the overlapping of federal, state and local 
authority such that any matter may presumptively be within the authority of two or 
more of federal and state and local governments.  For example, federal governments 
may regulate local issues such as remediation of contaminated sites, and state and 
local governments may exercise their powers to develop policies on environmental 
issues of national and even international importance such as climate change. 
Furthermore, these authorities are not static but adaptive to the regulatory needs so 
that the level of government dealing with an environmental problem may flip 
between federal and state powers depending on the circumstances.30  
 
The flexible distribution of authority allows government to react more quickly and 
with less political jockeying, and promotes increased cooperation and synergy 
between agencies. 31 Overlapping jurisdiction could also lead to inefficiencies and a 
lack of transparency as to ultimate authority and accountability. 
 
Dynamic federalism is an American theory but it is included in this paper because it 
provides possible insights in dealing with Aboriginal governments as a Third or 
Fourth Level of government  (federal, provincial, local and Aboriginal) within an 
ever-changing and more complex Canadian federalist system.   
 
2.5 New Governance Theory 
 
New Governance Theory provides a more participatory and collaborative model in 
which government, industry and other societal actors share responsibility for 
achieving policy objectives. Orly Lobel, in her seminal work on this topic, argues that 
the new governance model is intended to be an alternative to both state-based top 
down regulation and complete reliance on market-based norms by inventing 
                                                        
30 Ibid. at 1796 
31 JB Ruhl and John Salzman, “Climate Change, Dead Zones and Massive Problems in the Administrative 
State: A Guide to Whittling Away” (2010) 98 Calif. L. Rev. 59 at 103-107. 
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flexible and responsive administrative practices that are more suited to the modern 
reality than either large bureaucracies or private market mechanisms.32 
 
Lobel identifies the following attributes as the organizing principles of the new 
governance model: (1) increased participation of non-state actors; (2) stakeholder 
collaboration; (3) diversity and competition; (4) decentralization and subsidiarity; 
(5) integration of policy domains; (6) flexibility and non-coerciveness; (7) 
adaptability and dynamic learning; and (8) legal orchestration among proliferated 
norm generating entities. With regards to the final principle, she argues that this is 
achieved through the interpenetration of policy boundaries, new public/private 
partnerships and next-generation policy strategies which are more inclusive such as 
negotiated rule-making, decentralized and dynamic problem solving, disclosure 
regimes and coordinated information collection. 33  
 
Ruggie argues that corporate conduct is shaped by three distinct governance 
systems: (1) the system of public law and governance (domestic and international); 
(2) civil governance systems involving stakeholders/rightsholders affected by 
business enterprises and employing various social compliance mechanisms; and (3) 
corporate governance. He argues that often the public law system is not the 
dominant governance system at play and that stakeholder driven processes and 
internal corporate structures may be more effective in furthering policy goals.34 This 
suggests the need for a more collaborative regulatory model with increased 
interaction and greater synergies among various governance systems. 
 
New Governance values the process of dialogue and collective decision-making. 
Graben develops the concept of ‘deliberative democracy’. Deliberative democracy is 
a process-oriented goal involving the generation of collective decisions via reasoned 
                                                        
32 Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal 
Thought (November 2004) 89:262 at 268.  
33 Ibid. at 265-268.  
34 John Gerald Ruggie, “Global Governance and “New Governance Theory”: Lessons from Business and 
Human Rights” (2014) 20 Global Governance 5 at 9. 
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debate among all concerned stakeholders. 35 Holley, Gunningham and Shearing 
characterize new environmental governance as the collaboration between various 
stakeholders working together in furtherance of commonly agreed upon or 
mutually negotiated goals.36 The way that consensus is reached is as important as 
the outcome, although not every circumstance lends itself to this type of diffuse 
decision-making. 
 
Ruhl identifies new governance theory as one of several adaptive management 
theories that is potentially transformative. He argues that new governance 
principles allow for more diverse responses to a problem by broadening the number 
of instruments involved in environmental governance, thus creating resilience.37  
 
Ruhl and Salzman caution that the focus on experimentation, collaboration and 
diversity encouraged by new governance theorists, may also increase uncertainty 
and blur lines of agency accountability. They state poetically that the potential for 
backfire increases with the number of agencies and diversity of instruments thrown 
at a problem potentially leading to “a glorious mess.” 38  
 
This paper examines the importance of contractual agreements in expanding the 
northern regulatory regime and achieving environmental objectives. The response 
to climate change in the north needs to be coordinated, mutually reinforcing and 
oriented towards collective environmental goals. It will not be effective if it is simply 
a series of well-intentioned programs. New governance theory highlights the 
importance of engaging stakeholders/rights holders in dialogue and in the process 
of constructing a common vision that can span across these different regulatory 
instruments.  
                                                        
35 Sari M. Graben, “Assessing Stakeholder Participation in Sub-Arctic Co-Management: Administrative 
Rulemaking ad Private Agreements” (2011) 29 Windsor YB Access Just 195 (QL) at 4. 
36 Holley, Gunningham and Shearing, Supra note 19 at 4. 
37 “J.B. Ruhl, “Adaptation and Resiliency in Legal Systems: General Design Principles for Resilience and 
Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems – With Applications to Climate Change Adaptation” (2011) 89 North 
Carolina LR 1373 (QL) at 1401. 
38 Ruhl and Salzman, Supra note 31at 106-107. 
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2.6 Resilience Theory 
Resilience theorists argue that the current regulatory system can never adequately 
address the complexities of the natural and the social environment (and the 
complex interactions between the two). These theorists argue for an adaptive 
management approach to environmental regulation that has as its primary goal the 
promotion of flexibility, adaptability and the fostering of resilience. Resilience is the 
capacity of the system to absorb change and continue functioning. This is an 
emerging theory of environmental governance and therefore less established than 
the previously outlined theories. I outline below what I consider to be the key tenets 
of resilience theory. 
 
2.6.1 The environment is a complex system and must be regulated as a complex system 
 
The primary insight of resilience theory is that ecosystems are much more complex 
and interactive than previously acknowledged and that regulatory law is ill-suited to 
that fundamental reality.  
 
Kundis Craig draws a fundamental distinction between 'complicated systems and 
complex systems. Complicated systems are notable because the elements of that 
system maintain an element of independence from each other and the system can be 
managed by its individual components. She argues that most environmental 
problems are not amenable to this kind of compartmentalization precisely because 
they arise in complex ecosystems and previous attempts to break environmental 
problems into sub-components have largely been unsuccessful. Complex systems 
are more dynamic, exhibit complex collective behavior, and respond more readily to 
their internal and external environments. These dynamic capabilities give 
ecosystems a certain degree of flexibility to cope with changes in this system.39 That 
                                                        
39 Robin Kundis Craig, The Current State of Environmental Law: Part 1: Essay: Learning to Think about 
Complex Environmental Systems in Environmental and Natural Resources Law and Legal Scholarship: A 
Twenty-Year Retrospective in (2013) 24 Fordham Envirl. Law Rev. 87 at 87-92. 
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resilience is part of what needs to be fostered and protected in environmental 
regulation.  
 
2.6.2 Ecosystems exhibit a high degree of resilience, but are still evolving and capable of 
radical change 
 
Holling, Gunderson and Ludwig argue that ecosystems are robust when they have 
functional diversity and special heterogeneity in the species and physical variables 
and landscapes. The stability domains that define the ecosystem are so large that 
external disturbances have to be extreme and/or persistent before the system 
transforms irreversibly into another system. Nonetheless nature is evolving and it is 
important to acknowledge and plan for the unpredictable dynamics in ecosystems, 
including the potential for radical change.40 
 
Holling, Gunderson and Ludwig highlight that human society is also resilient in its 
interaction with the environment. Peoples’ adaptive capabilities have made it 
possible not only to persist passively, but also to create and innovate when limits 
are reached. This includes the ability to develop successful remedial policies 
incrementally once the need becomes apparent. They argue that a primary goal of 
environmental governance is to develop resilience in both the natural and human 
systems.41 This involves fostering diversity and adaptability in both the natural and 
human systems so that these systems are better able to absorb change while still 
maintaining their fundamental characteristics. 
 
Kundis Craig and Harm Benson argue that environmental regulation must also 
acknowledge and plan for the possibility of radical regime change resulting from 
climate change.42 This challenges some fundamental assumptions about 
environmental law, including sustainability.  
                                                        
40 C.S. Holling, Lance H. Gunderson and Donald Ludwig, “In Quest of a Theory of Adaptive Change” in 
Lance H. Gunderson and C.S. Holling eds. Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and 
Natural Systems, (Washington: Island Press 2002) at 15.-18 
41 Ibid at 18. 
42 Kundis Craig and Harm Benson, Supra note 17 at 857-858. 
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2.6.3 Some resilience theorists challenge sustainability as a key organizing concept for 
environmental governance 
 
A key focus of environmental regulation in recent years has been on sustainable 
development. Sustainable development is most often defined as “development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet its own needs.” This definition is taken from the Bruntland 
Report, and has two key organizing concepts: (1) the limits on development 
imposed by the environment and (2) the priority should be given to the needs of the 
world’s poorest populations and to inter-generational equity.43 
 
Dernback correctly notes that sustainability is one of the most important ideas to 
have emerged from the twentieth century. He argues that sustainability-thinking 
involves a shift away from thinking about environmental costs to treating the 
environment as a source of environmental benefits and opportunities. The 
environment and society are interlinked such that continuing environmental 
degradation cannot promote human well-being.44 This requires structuring our 
economic and social development so that it does not further degrade the 
environment but rather, seeks to protect and restore the environment.  
  
Kundis Craig and Harm Benson argue that sustainability is no longer a realistic 
environmental management strategy. They contend that sustainability is founded on 
an incorrect premise that the environment can be managed through a balancing of 
environmental and development factors. With proper resource management, there 
is always a way to return to an optimal state of the nature. This is based on a belief 
that nature is static and that baseline environmental conditions will remain more or 
less the same over long periods of time with minimal ecological complexity. Kundis 
                                                        
43 G.H. Bruntland and World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future: 
Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1987). 
44 John C. Dernbach “Sustainable Development” (2012) Widener Law School Legal Studies Research 
Paper Series N0. 13-24 available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2256672. 
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Craig and Harm Benson argue that climate change is a “game-changer” such that 
baseline conditions are no longer reliable indicators of future behavior and eco-
systems may be transforming into new and irreversible states of being. This “non-
stationarity” requires the displacement of sustainability goals with environmental 
goals aimed at encouraging resilience.45  
 
Garmestani, Allen and Cabezas are resilience theorists that continue to advocate 
sustainability as a fundamental environmental policy goal. They note that fostering 
resilience is a key component of sustainability so that the two concepts can be 
mutually reinforcing.46  
 
Denbrack and Cheever argue that sustainability and resilience are mutually 
reinforcing terms. Sustainability is a decision-making framework as well as an 
environmental goal. Within this decision-making framework, environmental 
protection must be integrated into decisions about social and economic 
development, and social justice and economic viability must be integrated into 
decisions about environmental quality. Resilience is an important consideration for 
sustainability. However, resilience does not have the same normative basis as 
sustainability. Decision makers should not ignore human well-being, persistent 
global poverty and social equity. Denbrack and Cheever argue that sustainability 
remains an important equitable concept that needs to be reinforced not undermined 
by resilience theory.47 
 
Bosselmann identifies three factors that continue to make sustainable development 
politically relevant: (1) it provides an alternative narrative to the growth paradigm 
                                                        
45 Kundis Craig and Harm Benson, Supra note 17 at 856-862 
46 Ahjond S. Garmestani, Craig R. Allen and Heriberto Cabezas in “Resilience and Environmental Law 
Reform Symposium: Panarchy, Adaptive Management and Governance: Policy Options for Building 
Resilience (2009) 87 Neb. L. Rev. 1036 
47 John C. Dernback and Federico Cheever, “Sustainable Development and its Discontents” (2015) 4:2 
Transnational Environmental Law 247 available online at 
http://journals.cambridge.org.abstract_S2047102515000163 at 279-287. 
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which people in power cannot ignore; (2) the broad, ambiguous meaning of 
sustainable development makes it appealing to a wide group of interests who are 
able to draw on sustainable development for moral legitimacy; and (3) it links 
ecological, economic, and social issues and therefore encourages dialogue and 
concrete steps towards achieving sustainable development among diverse groups 
including industry, governments, and environmental non-government 
organizations.48 Bosselmann correctly identifies the political importance of the 
sustainable development movement in translating theory into concrete action. The 
broad process of dialogue and diverse decision-making also fosters a more flexible 
and adaptable approach to environmental management that reinforces resilience 
thinking. 
 
 
2.6.4 Current environmental decision-making is not well suited to address complex 
ecological issues 
 
Many resilience theorists are concerned that there is a fundamental disconnect 
between the regulatory problem that needs to be addressed and the regulatory tools 
employed by the regulator. Ruhl and Salzman argue that current environmental 
regulation erroneously regards environmental effects as homogeneous, linear and 
proportionally aggregated. This leads to a system that is heavily reliant on cost-
benefit analysis, risk assessment and pre-decision assessment.49 Kundis Craig and 
Ruhl note that heavy reliance on these types of front-end analytical tools is 
misguided in a system characterized by constant change. The current system makes 
the erroneous assumption that there is a robust capacity to predict and assess 
market and non-market impacts of a proposed development when in fact that kind 
of up-front analysis is not feasible in a complex environmental system.50 A robust 
                                                        
48 Klaus Bosselmann, “The Concept of Sustainable Development” in Klaus Bosselmann, David 
Grinlinton and Prue Taylor eds. Environmental Law for a Sustainable Society 2nd ed. (New Zealand 
Centre for Environmental Law Monograph Series: Volume 1, 2013) at 96. 
49 Ruhl and Salzman, Supra note 31 at 66. 
50 Robin Kundis Craig and JB Ruhl “ Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive Management” (2014) 67 
Vand. L. Rev. 1 at 6-7. 
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regulatory system needs the capacity to constantly assess and re-assess and to 
adapt accordingly. 
 
In their scientific research, Holling and Meffe noted that management strategies 
often fail to account for the complexity of ecosystems. As a result of misguided 
management efforts, systems can gradually lose resilience and become less able to 
absorb disturbances.51 Garmestani, Allen and Cabezas are particularly critical of 
“single trait-maximization laws” that address complex ecological issues from a 
single standpoint. They argue that U.S. Endangered Species Act, 1973 failed as a 
regulatory strategy because it did not adequately take account for the complex 
interactions of endangered species within the eco-system. By focusing only on the 
species at risk, it actually created a system which was more vulnerable to 
development.52 
 
2.6.5 The modern regulatory system must incorporate adaptive management 
 
Resilience theorists argue that adaptive management is key to effective 
environmental regulation of resources and the environment. Adaptive management 
recognizes the need to react to ongoing changes in the environment rather than 
assume a linear and static environmental response. 
 
Arnold and Gunderson contend that adaptive regulation must recognize the 
complex relationship between ecosystems and social systems and aim to design 
structures, methods and processes that enhance the adaptive capacity of both the 
environmental and the social systems. They identify the key features of a more 
adaptive legal system as: (1) multiplicity of articulated goals; (2) polycentric, 
multimodal and integrationist structure; (3) adaptive measures based on flexibility, 
                                                        
51 C.S. Holling and Gary K. Meffe, “Command and Control and the Pathology of Natural Resource 
Management (1996)10 Conservation Biology 328 at 332 as quoted by Ahjond S. Garmestani, Craig R. 
Allen and Heriberto Cabezas in “Resilience and Environmental Law Reform Symposium: Panarchy, 
Adaptive Management and Governance: Policy Options for Building Resilience (2009) 87 Neb. L. Rev. 
1036 at 1039. 
52 Garmestani, Allen and Cabezas, Supra Note 46 at 1039-1040. 
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discretion, and regard for context; and (4) iterative legal-pluralist processes with 
feedback loops and accountability. 53 
 
Of particular interest is Arnold and Gunderson’s focus on polycentrism and 
multimodality. Polycentrism refers to a structure in which there are multiple 
centers or sources of authority. Multimodality refers to the use of multiple methods 
for achieving a policy goal in a way that aims to connect and integrate the various 
methods. Arnold and Gunderson write that both are features of adaptive law that 
make it possible to deal with complex environmental and social problems without 
breaking them down into sub-components and missing the larger picture.54  
 
Ruhl distinguishes between engineering resilience and ecological resilience in the 
design of regulatory instruments. Engineering resilience focuses on the return to the 
equilibrium state, and relies on the tools of reliability, efficiency, and quality control. 
Ecological resilience, in contrast, is measured by the amount of change that a system 
can absorb before it changes from one structural state to another. Ecological 
resilience relies on the tools of scalability (allowing the system to shift relevant 
temporal and spatial scales to adjust for changing conditions), modularity (allowing 
the system to shift functions and relationships within the system to adjust to 
changing conditions) and evolvability (fostering the capacity for the system to 
manage these shifts for extended periods of time).55  
 
Ruhl argues that a regulatory system must develop the adaptive capacity to move 
between resilience strategies (engineering and ecological resilience) as conditions 
change and there are shifts in variability and predictability. He argues that the 
current regime is currently designed for engineering resilience as reflected in the 
focus on pre-decision environmental assessment, cost-benefit analysis, records of 
decision and judicial review litigation. This is premised on a relatively static view of 
                                                        
53 Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold and Lance H. Gunderson, “Adaptive Law” forthcoming in Craig R. Allen 
and Ahjond S. Garmestani, eds, “Resilience and Law” (Columbia University Press, 2013) at 5. 
54 Ibid at 12-18. 
55 Ruhl, Supra note 37 at 1-7 
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nature. However, environmental variables such as climate change can lead to a 
situation where variability of change is high and predictability is low so that 
ecological resilience strategies offer an important enhancement of flexibility and 
should be the default for design purposes. 56  
 
For example, the MVRMA is appropriately predicated on robust environmental 
assessment (engineering resilience). However, the environment is constantly 
changing and the challenge for northern regulators is to build into the system 
appropriate monitoring and follow-up in order to address unexpected 
environmental and social changes (ecological resilience). The regulatory system 
needs to be sufficiently flexible that it can allow for changes in mitigations in real 
time without the need for time consuming administrative law remedies.  
 
2.6.6 Stakeholder engagement is an important element in managing for resilience 
 
 
Resilience theorists stress the importance of stakeholder engagement in increasing 
flexibility and adaptability of the system. Stakeholder engagement can also be a 
critical element in establishing the political viability of a project. 
 
Kundis Craig and Ruhl maintain that adaptive management theory has evolved into 
two main branches. The Decision-Theoretic model emphasizes working with 
relevant policy stakeholders to define the management problem but then relies on 
agency experts to develop the process models to guide decision-making. The 
Resilience-Experimentalist model emphasizes maintaining a shared understanding 
among the relevant policy stakeholders through a continuous process of learning, 
hypothesis testing and experimentation within the management-problem context. 
There is much greater emphasis on continued stakeholder involvement and multi-
                                                        
56 Ibid.at 5-7. Ruhl is specifically referring to the American environmental regime but the MVRMA has 
a similar focus on engineering resilience. 
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party collaborative planning in the latter.57 In my experience, the Decision-Theoretic 
School is most often employed by government but shared regulation among a 
multiplicity of stakeholders/shareholders as is advocated in this paper, requires a 
shift to the Resilience-Experimentalist model.  
 
Garmestani, Allen and Cabezas highlight the importance of “bridging organizations” 
in catalyzing the formation of policies that are flexible and reflective of resilience 
management. Examples of “bridging organizations” include (1) assessment teams, 
which are made up of actors across sectors in a socio-ecological system; (2) non-
governmental organizations, which create an arena for trust-building, learning, 
conflict resolution and adaptive co-management; and (3) the scientific community 
which acts as a watchdog and facilitator for adaptive management.58  
 
Bridging organizations perform a fundamental role in adaptive management 
because that they are able to monitor the status of the socio-ecological system and 
can be a catalyst for rapid change if conditions are deteriorating. They also serve an 
important role in facilitating cross-scale linkages, improving communications and 
creating opportunities for collaboration within the system.59 
 
2.6.7 Law is also a complex adaptive system and is maladapted to resilience thinking 
 
Adaptive management poses some formidable challenges for the legal system. It 
necessarily gives more discretion to decision-makers, which raises concerns 
regarding accountability. The lack of finality in decision-making is unnerving to 
investors and can potentially discourage investment. In addition, there is the 
potential for a lack of transparency given the multiplicity of regulatory actors and 
regulatory decisions. 
 
                                                        
57 Kundis Craig and Ruhl, Supra Note 50 at 7 and 17. 
58 Garmestani, Allen and Cabezas Supra note 46 at 1050. 
59 Ibid at 1049. 
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Kundis Craig and Ruhl contend that administrative law is resistant to this type of 
multi-stage adaptive decision-making. Kundis Craig and Ruhl identify concerns over 
(1) agency discretion, (2) lack of finality, (3) the potential for endless judicial review 
of numerous agency decisions, and (4) difficulty managing expectations of public 
input at all stages of “dial-turning”. These obstacles need to be addressed if 
administrative law is to meaningfully co-exist with adaptive management.60 
 
Arnold and Gunderson argue that an adaptive legal system would need to provide 
the right combination of adaptive flexibility and principled accountability of the 
decision-makers. They contend that discretionary decision-making is a necessary 
element of adaptive environmental management and that concerns regarding the 
arbitrary nature of discretion can be addressed through the development of 
appropriate and relevant standards to govern the exercise of discretion and to 
which decision-makers can be held accountable.61  
 
Kundis Craig and Harm Benson argue that this can be achieved through ‘principled 
flexibility’. This involves a focus on stronger, legally enforceable and institutionally 
supported goals but more flexibility on how these goals might be achieved and an 
increased ability to adapt to changing conditions.62  
 
Ruhl argues that law in itself is a complex adaptive system. This leads to the 
challenge of one complex adaptive system attempting to regulate another complex 
adaptive system. Ruhl believes that our legal regime is fundamentally incompatible 
with adaptive management strategies. Successfully working with the dynamic forces 
of complex adaptive natural and social systems demands an active and adaptive 
management regime that eschews optimization approaches seeking stability. Yet 
one of the goals of law is to establish and maintain relatively stable contexts within 
which other social systems (banking, health care, education) can operate over time. 
                                                        
60 Kundis Craig and Ruhl, Supra note 50 at 40-49. 
61 Arnold and Gunderson, Supra note 53 at 29. 
62 Kundis Craig and Harm Benson, Supra note 17 at 877. 
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This concept is integral to the way that law has developed and continues to develop. 
It remains to be seen whether such disparate and conflicting goals can ever be 
reconciled.63 
 
Stacey also argues that law is ill suited to environmental protection because the 
amount of executive discretion required to address complex environmental 
problems is incompatible with the rules of administrative decision-making. She 
argues that this incompatibility can be addressed through existing legal mechanisms 
and by treating environmental protection as an ongoing emergency.64 
 
This paper will incorporate insights from all of the above theories but particularly 
from the schools of responsive regulation, new governance and resilience because of 
their particular focus on increasing adaptability and flexibility in environmental 
regulation and their focus on incorporating multiple stakeholders and rights holders 
into the overall management regime. These are key characteristics required for 
effective environmental management in the north.  
                                                        
63 Ruhl, J.B. “Panarchy and the Law” (2012) Ecology and Society 17(3):31 available online at 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol17/iss3/art31/ at 2. 
64 Jocelyn Stacey “The Environmental Emergency and the Legality of Discretion in Environmental 
Law” (2015) 53(1) Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Forthcoming and available online at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2619688. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3 The Regulatory Regime Established in the Mackenzie 
Valley Region of the Northwest Territories 
This Chapter provides an overview of the environmental regulatory regime in the 
Mackenzie Valley as well as the interaction of that regime with Aboriginal law and 
particularly Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution.65  
 
3.1 A brief overview of Environmental Law in Canada and in the 
Northwest Territories 
Canada is a federal state with division of powers between the federal and provincial 
governments. The heads of powers for each government are set out in Sections 91 
and 92 of the Canadian Constitution.66 The environment is not specifically identified 
as a head of power in the Canadian Constitution and as a result, neither the federal 
or provincial governments have exclusive jurisdiction over the environment. 
Instead, environmental jurisdiction is shared by the provincial and federal 
governments under other heads of powers including property and civil rights, 
criminal law, fisheries and oceans, shipping and natural resources. The federal 
government has constitutional responsibility for aboriginal issues, which is also a 
major influence on resource development and environmental issues in the north. 
 
The Northwest Territories is not a province and does not have the constitutional 
powers set out in Section 92. However, the federal government has delegated 
powers normally exercised by the provinces to the government of the Northwest 
Territories though a number of Federal Acts, most notably the Northwest Territories 
Act. 67 The Northwest Territories Act is not constitutionally protected and could be 
revoked by another Act of the federal parliament. Still, the Northwest Territories is 
evolving as an independent entity from the federal government and the Courts have 
                                                        
65 Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 &31 Vict, c3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5. 
66 Ibid.  
67 Northwest Territories Act, SC 2014 c2, s2. This implements devolution and replaces Northwest 
Territories Act, RSC 1985, CN-27. 
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recognized that the NWT has a special province-like status.68  Since 1967, the NWT 
has been delegated responsibility for health care, education, social services, 
highways, airport administration and forestry management. 
 
In April 2014, the federal government devolved the management of public land, 
water and resources from the Government of Canada to the Government of the 
Northwest Territories (GNWT). 69 The GNWT will now have decision-making 
authority about the use of public land, water and resources in the NWT. As well, the 
GNWT will be entitled to 50% of the resource revenue from development on public 
land in the NWT.70 This is a historic change that will greatly increase regional 
control over resource development in the north. 
 
The key piece of environmental legislation in the Mackenzie Valley region of the 
NWT is the Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act (MVRMA)71, which is an 
integrated resource management act dealing with the regulation of land and water 
in the NWT as well as environmental assessment. The MVRMA is still federal 
legislation, but a number of responsibilities and decision-making authorities held by 
the federal Minister under the MVRMA, including the authority of approve Type A 
water licenses, the designation of inspectors, the holding of security and powers, 
and many of the duties and functions related to environmental assessment were 
delegated to the GNWT.72 The GNWT considers this delegated authority to be an 
interim step and has negotiated a review of these provisions in the devolution 
                                                        
68 See Morin v.Crawford, (1999) 14 Admin LR 287 (NWTSC) and Federation Franco Tenoise v. Canada 
(Attorney General), 2006 NWTSC 20. 
69 Bill C-15, Northwest Territories Devolution Act, 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2014 (royal assent 2014-03-25). In 
addition to the provisions dealing with devolution, Bill C-15 contained numerous amendments to the 
MVRMA. 
70 “Frequently Asked Questions about Devolution”, Government of the Northwest Territories website at 
http://devolution.gov.nt.ca/about-devolution/faq/general-devolution-faq. 
71 Supra, Note 8. 
72 A copy of the delegation letter from federal Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, 
Bernard Valcourt to Territorial Ministers Michael Miltenberger and Robert McLeod dated March 27, 2014 
is available on the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board website at https:// www. 
mvlwb.com/sites/default/documents/Devo. 
30 
 
 
 
agreement in five years.73 The GNWT ultimately would like to make the MVRMA 
territorial legislation.  
 
The MVRMA will be scrutinized in the next five years as the GNWT decides the 
direction of resource development in the north. This provides a unique opportunity 
to re-visit some of the operating principles of the MVRMA, and perhaps address, as 
this paper argues, the need for more strategic vision on global environmental issues 
and the need to develop a regulatory strategy that prioritizes adaptive management 
strategies and acknowledges resilience in eco-systems as an environmental goal.  
 
3.2 A Brief Overview of Aboriginal Law in the Northwest Territories 
3.2.1 The MVRMA Co-Management Regime as a Treaty Right 
 
The operation of the MVRMA is profoundly influenced by its interaction with Section 
35 of the Canadian Constitution. Section 35 recognizes and affirms the existing 
Aboriginal and Treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada. The Supreme 
Court of Canada has interpreted Section 35 as requiring the federal and territorial 
governments to justify the infringement of an aboriginal right in accordance with 
the constitutional test set out in the case of R v. Sparrow.74  
 
It is well recognized that resource development projects frequently infringe on 
Aboriginal and Treaty rights. Section 35 provides an incentive to the governments to 
work through environmental issues with the aboriginal population in order to avoid 
conflict and constitutional litigation on the interpretation of Aboriginal and Treaty 
rights.  
 
                                                        
73 “Department of Lands – MVRMA”, Government of the Northwest Territories website at 
http://www.lands.gov.nt.ca/mvrma. 
74 R. v. Sparrow [1990] 1 SCR 1075. The Sparrow decision places the onus on the Crown seeking to 
infringe on aboriginal rights to establish (1) that the objective behind the infringement is valid, substantial 
and compelling and (2) that the infringement is consistent with the Honour of the Crown. 
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There is also an argument that the co-management regime established under the 
MVRMA is an existing Treaty right that is constitutionally protected under Section 
35. The argument is based on the fact that (1) the co-management regime was 
established pursuant to the Sahtu, Gwich’in and Tlicho land claim agreements75 and 
(2) these land claim agreements are modern treaties.  
 
The matter is currently before the Courts. The Tlicho government has commenced 
an action to prevent the federal Government from implementing amendments to the 
MVRMA which would eliminate the regional Land and Water Boards. The authority 
of the regional boards would be absorbed into a restructured Mackenzie Valley Land 
and Water Board that still allows for substantial Aboriginal membership on the new 
Board. The Tlicho claim that the Wek’eezhii Land and Water Board is protected by 
the co-management provisions in the land claim. The Supreme Court of the 
Northwest Territories has granted an injunction finding that there was a significant 
constitutional issue to be heard.76 The federal government appealed that injunction 
but subsequently announced that the action would not proceed further.77  
 
3.2.2 The Duty to Consult  
 
Section 35 has also been interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada to include an 
obligation on the Crown to consult with aboriginal people before engaging in 
conduct that might adversely affect their Aboriginal rights or title. In some 
circumstances, this may include a corresponding duty to accommodate aboriginal 
concerns. 78 In the resource management context, this could include imposing terms 
and conditions in permits to protect aboriginal rights or interests, or paying 
compensation.  
 
                                                        
75 This is discussed in more detail in Paragraph 3.3. 
76 Tlicho Government v. The Attorney General of Canada et al. [2015] NWTSC 9. 
77 Guy Quenneville, “Canada pauses legal fight to launch NWT land and water superboard”, CBC (11 
December 2015) online at www.cbc.ca. 
78 Haida Nation v. British Columbia, [2004] 3 SCR 511; Taku River Tlingit FN v. British Columbia v. 
Canada (Attorney General) 2007 FC 763. 
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Resource development permits in the Mackenzie Valley frequently impact 
Aboriginal rights (particularly Aboriginal rights to harvest wildlife) and trigger the 
government’s obligation to consult with affected Aboriginal groups. This has the 
potential to be a time-consuming and politically charged process. However, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has also indicated that the Federal Government can, in 
appropriate circumstances, rely on its statutory processes in order to fulfill the duty 
to consult.79  
 
This Federal Court considered the link between the MVRMA and Section 35 in 
Ka’a’Gee Tu First Nation v. Canada (Attorney General). 80 The Federal Court found 
that the MVRMA process provided a significant opportunity for consultation with 
Aboriginal groups on Section 35 issues. However, the process was flawed because 
the federal and territorial ministers did not consult with affected Aboriginal groups 
prior to modifying a decision of The Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact 
Review Board (MVEIRB) under Section 130 even though there was no statutory 
requirement that they do so. They struck down the decision and required the 
ministers to further consult with the Aboriginal group. 
 
The federal and territorial governments rely on the MVRMA board process to meet 
the majority of their Section 35 consultation obligations. As a result, the federal and 
territorial governments must ensure that the board processes provide significant 
opportunities for Aboriginal engagement. This provides an incentive for those 
governments to build capacity for the Aboriginal communities to participate in the 
hearings and to provide participant funding to ensure that the board processes 
allow for meaningful Aboriginal consultation. As well, it creates an incentive for the 
federal and territorial governments to encourage developers to enter into 
contractual agreements with Aboriginal groups (impact benefit agreements, 
environmental agreements). Those contractual agreements often contain 
accommodations for impacts to Aboriginal and Treaty rights which the federal and 
                                                        
79 Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada [2005] 3 SCR 550.  
80 Ka’a’Gee Tu First Nation v. Canada (Attorney General) 2007 FC 763.  
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territorial governments under Section 35 must be satisfied are appropriate as part 
of their fiduciary obligations to the Aboriginal peoples. 
 
3.2.3 The Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act (NWT) 
 
Environmental regulation in the Mackenzie Valley region of the Northwest 
Territories is governed primarily by the MVRMA. Land use permits and water 
licenses are issued pursuant to the MVRMA. Other authorizations are issued 
pursuant to both federal and territorial legislation. Fisheries authorizations are 
issued pursuant to the federal Fisheries Act81 and timber cutting permits are issued 
pursuant to the territorial Forest Management Act.82 The environmental assessment 
procedure under the MVRMA is triggered by an application for a permit under either 
federal or territorial legislation. Once the recommendations of the environmental 
assessment panel are accepted by the federal and territorial government, they 
become binding on all federal and territorial officials exercising their authority, 
under both federal and territorial legislation.83 In this way, the MVRMA works with 
other legislation to form the environmental regulatory system.  
 
3.3 MVRMA - Origin in Comprehensive Land Claims 
 
The MVRMA was enacted in 1998 to implement the federal government’s land claim 
obligations. It applies in the Mackenzie Valley region of the Northwest Territories, 
which corresponds generally to the ancestral lands of the Dene peoples located 
within the boundaries of the Northwest Territories.84 Excluded are those from the 
                                                        
81 R.S.C. 1985, C.F-14. 
82 R.S.N.W.T. 2009, C.16. 
83 Section 131(5), MVRMA. Ministers are required to “carry out the decision to the extent of their respective 
authorities”.  
84 The Mackenzie Valley is defined in the Gwich’in Comprehensive Land claim as the area within the 
Northwest Territories that is bounded on the south by the 60th parallel of latitude excluding the area of 
Wood Buffalo National Park; on the west by the border between the Northwest Territories and Yukon 
Territory; on the north by the boundary of the Western Arctic Region; and on the east by the boundary of 
the settlement area of the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut. The Gwich’in Comprehensive Land Claim was 
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Western Arctic Region of the Northwest Territories, which comprises the ancestral 
lands of the Inuvialuit, a distinct Aboriginal group from the Dene. The Inuvialuit 
have a different environmental management regime as negotiated in the Inuvialuit 
Land Claim Agreement.85 
 
The MVRMA is primarily designed to address integrated resource management. The 
MVRMA is intended to address resource development in the fragile arctic ecosystem, 
which extends beyond the traditional territory of any one aboriginal group. 
Aboriginal property and other distributive issues are addressed in other initiatives 
such as land claim negotiations and impact benefit agreements. John Donihee, legal 
counsel to the MVRMA boards, suggests that this was a deliberate decision on the 
part of the Aboriginal groups who had experience with large scale development in 
the North. They identified the need for a broader approach to resource development 
that recognized that the arctic eco-system transcended aboriginal settlement 
boundaries.86 
 
The MVRMA addresses the federal government’s obligations to (1) establish an 
integrated and coordinated system of land and water management and (2) to 
establish a co-management regime with Aboriginal peoples as first negotiated in the 
Gwich’in Comprehensive Land Claim and the Sahtu Dene and Metis Comprehensive 
Land Claim.87 The federal government subsequently entered into a Comprehensive 
Land Claim and Self-government Agreement with the Tlicho government, and the 
MVMRA was amended in order to include the federal government’s obligations to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
signed on September 6, 1992 and came into force as the Gwi’chin Land Claim Settlement Act SC 1992, 
c.53 
85 The Western Arctic Claim – the Inuvialuit Final Agreement was signed on June 5, 1984 and came into 
force as the Western Arctic (Inuvialuit) Land Claims Act SC 1984, c 24. 
86 John Donihee, “Implementing Co-Management Legislation in the Mackenzie Valley” (Calgary: Canadian 
Institute of Resources Law, 2001) at 5. 
87 The Gwich’in Comprehensive Land Claim was signed on September 6, 1992 and came into force as the 
Gwi’chin Land Claim Settlement Act SC 1992, c.53; The Sahtu Dene and Metis Comprehensive Land 
Claim was signed on September 6, 1993 and came into force as the Sahtu Dene and Metis Land Claim 
Settlement Act, SC 1994, c.27.  
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the Tlicho and to add provisions that specifically recognized the functions of the 
Tlicho government.88  
 
The Gwich’in Comprehensive Land Claim provides some insight as to the Parties’ 
understanding of the co-management regime to be established. Paragraph 1.17 sets 
as a key objective “To provide the Gwich’in the right to participate in the decision-
making concerning the use, management, and conservation of land, water and 
resources.” However, this is not meant to be an equal power-sharing arrangement 
between governments and Aboriginal groups. Paragraph 24.1.1 (c) clearly 
establishes that the ultimate jurisdiction for the regulation of land and water 
continues to rest with the Federal and Territorial governments.89 
 
There are three main Aboriginal groups in the NWT that still do not have settled 
land claims (Deh cho, Akaitcho, Yellowknives). The practice has been to nominate 
representatives from the unrepresented groups to the Mackenzie Valley 
Environmental Impact Review Board and the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water 
Board while the government continues to negotiate land claims with those 
Aboriginal groups. This is not always well received.90 In 2007, the Deh cho First 
Nation refused to nominate members to the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water 
Board or the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board in protest. They 
did not always recognize the legitimacy of the MVRMA boards.91 
 
Ultimately, the Federal Government would like to have one integrated resource 
management regime that includes all of the Aboriginal groups in the NWT. Some 
Aboriginal groups object that they are being pressured to adopt a model of resource 
management that they did not negotiate. For example, the Deh cho advocate for a 
                                                        
88 The Tli’cho Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement, which was signed on August 25, 2003 and came 
into force as the Tli’cho Land Claims and Self-Government Act, SC, 2005, c. 1.  
89 Supra, Note 87. 
90 The provisions allowing the Federal and Territorial Ministers to nominate members area 
contained in Sections 99(4) (MVLWB) and Section 112 (MVEIRB), MVRMA. 
91 “Dehcho First Nation refuses to nominate members for Boards”, Northern News Services, (23 March 
2007) online: http://www.nnsl.com/frames/newspapers/2007-03/mar23_07dc.html. 
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Deh cho Resource Management Authority with similar powers to the Mackenzie 
Valley Boards but operating as a stand-alone regime.92 Christensen and Grant 
similarly observed that the Deh cho and the Akaitcho have resisted inclusion in the 
MVRMA because of concerns that they were not adequately consulted in the drafting 
of the legislation and were forced into the MVRMA as a pre-determined legislative 
arrangement. The authors express concern that Aboriginal groups without settled 
land claims were not given the same kind of decision-making power in the drafting 
processes as those with settled claims.93 
 
3.3.1 MVRMA – Objectives and Legislative scheme 
 
 
The objectives of the MVRMA are largely process-oriented and involve the balancing 
of competing interests rather than identifying clear policy priorities. There is no 
overarching purposive section in the MVRMA although there are some purposive 
statements associated with particular Parts of the Act.94  
 
The Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board on its website states that the 
regulatory regime in the NWT it based on two principles: (1) integration and co-
ordination, and (2) co-management of resources between governments and 
Aboriginal groups.95 This is generally supported by the legislative scheme in the 
MVRMA and in the references to the land claim obligations set out in the Preamble. 
These are, however, decision-making frameworks as opposed to environmental 
goals. 
 
                                                        
92 See Grand Chief Herb Norwegian, “Statement to the Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 
Committee on Bill C-15,” January 27, 2014 available online at http://openparliament.ca/aboriginal-
affairs/41/2/10/grand-chief-herb-norwegian-1/only/. 
93 Julia Christensen and Miriam Grant, “How Political Changed Paved the Way for Indigenous Knowledge: 
The Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act (2007)60:2 Arctic 115 at 120. 
94 There are general purposive statements contained in Sections 9.1, 101, 114, 115 and 117(3)(d) of the 
MVRMA. 
95 Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board website at http://mvlwb.com/content/co-management. 
37 
 
 
 
Alternatives North and Ecology North, two prominent environmental NGOs, 
described the political and legislative objectives of the MVRMA as “co-management 
of the NWT’s land and waters, through an integrated regional and territorial-level 
system of environmental planning and assessment and regulatory review.”96 For 
Graben, there are two key objectives of the MVRMA: (1) effective resource 
management, and (2) power sharing with Aboriginal groups. She argues that the 
Treaties assume that both these objectives will be accomplished through the 
incorporation of Aboriginal persons in the decision-making process.97  
 
These sources generally agree that the key focus of the MVRMA regime is on process. 
There is minimal guidance within the legislation on strategic environmental goals. 
This lack of emphasis on strategic environmental goals was identified by the 
Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (CARC) early in the legislative process and is 
noted in their submission to the Standing Committee on the MVRMA. CARC 
supported the objective of integrated resource management but recommended that 
the Bill be re-drafted to acknowledge that integrated resource management is not 
the end goal but is designed to promote overall environmental objectives, 
particularly healthy ecosystems. They recommended that the objective clauses of 
the Bill be specifically informed by the precautionary and sustainability principles.98 
They argued for a move away from process-oriented reform and argued for 
increased focus on strategic environmental goals. 
 
The MVRMA is noteworthy for its lack of overt focus on sustainability.99 This is 
unusual in modern environmental protection legislation, particularly following the 
                                                        
96 Alternatives North and Ecology North, “Brief to the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and 
Northern Development Regarding Section 4 of Bill C-15, “ January 17, 2014 available online at www. 
alternatives north.ca.  
97Sari M. Graben, “Living in Perfect Harmony: Harmonizing Sub-Arctic Co-Management through Judicial 
Review” (2011) 49 Osgood Hall LJ 199 (QL) at 206. 
98 Canadian Arctic Resources Council, “CARC Submission to the Standing Committee on Aboriginal 
Affairs and Northern Development on Bill C-6 – The Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act,” 
(1998), available on-line at http://www.carc.org/rndtable/mvrmp.htm. 
99 The only direct reference to sustainability is found in Section 117(3)(d) which is not prominent in the 
legislation and only applies to environmental impact review, not environmental impact assessment. 
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Rio Declaration, which brought sustainability to prominence internationally as a key 
environmental principle that was frequently reflected in domestic legislation.100  
 
The environmental assessment provisions in the MVRMA displaced the 
environmental assessment provisions in the 1992 Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act (CEAA). There were some obvious similarities between the two 
regimes. For example, they take a similar approach to environmental assessment 
and the factors that need to be considered in determining an adverse impact on the 
environment and much of the MVRMA process was modeled on CEAA.101  
 
When the MVRMA was enacted CEAA 1992 contained several direct references to 
sustainable development. For example, the Preamble to CEAA identified the 
importance of integrating environmental factors and decision-making processes in a 
manner that promotes sustainable development. Section 4(1)(b) of CEAA identified 
one of the purposes of the Act is to “encourage responsible authorities to take 
actions and promote sustainable development and thereby achieve or maintain a 
healthy environment and a healthy economy”.102 These overarching purposive 
statements are not in the MVRMA, suggesting that the decision not to focus on 
sustainability in the MVRMA may have been a deliberate choice. One of the key 
deficiencies with the MVRMA is the lack of strategic guidance on addressing global 
environmental issues. Sustainability is not necessarily the only appropriate goal. 
However, it is important to have some shared environmental goals that are reflected 
                                                        
100 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 31 ILM 874 (1992). 
101 For a discussion of other similarities between CEAA (1992 version)and the MVRMA see Graben, Supra 
Note 24. 
102 The old Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c.37 was repealed in 2012 and 
replaced by the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, S.C. 2012, c.19, s52). In the 1992 
version, there were two references to sustainable development in the preamble and it was clearly 
identified as a key environmental goal. The 2012 version removed all references to sustainable 
development from the preamble, although it continued to reference sustainable development in the 
purposive section – now section 4(1)(h). The new federal government of Justin Trudeau has initiated 
a review of CEAA, 2012 and was critical of the revisions of CEAA during the election campaign. There 
may be a move back towards a broader definition of environmental goals including sustainability in 
environmental legislation. 
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in legislation and therefore provide some legislative structure to principled 
flexibility.  
 
Galbraith, Bradshaw and Rutherford argue that, while sustainable development is 
not a stated goal in the MVRMA, it is identified by the Mackenzie Valley Land and 
Water Board as a goal in practice.103 While this is a practical solution, it is not an 
adequate substitute for legislative guidance because it is dependent on the political 
leanings of the Board and could change over time, or as a result of pressure 
emanating from a particular project. It also provides no legal basis for judicial 
review should the Board not consider the issue of sustainability. Most importantly, it 
signals a lack of conversation and consensus about where we are collectively 
headed. The lack of a reference to environmental goals, including sustainability, in 
the legislation is a key weakness. 
 
3.3.2 The MVRMA Board Structures 
 
Overview of the Co-Management Boards 
The MVRMA establishes three types of boards as part of its regulatory management 
scheme to deal with (1) land and water regulation, (2) environmental assessment, 
and (3) land use planning.104 A very innovative feature of the MVRMA is that Part 6 
provides for the creation of a Cumulative Impacts Monitoring Program (the CIMP) 
and an environmental audit to be conducted every five years. 105 This suggests a 
focus on adaptive management, which has unfortunately not quite met expectations. 
 
The MVRMA Boards are frequently referred to as co-management boards as a result 
of the requirement for aboriginal membership. While the Federal Minister of the 
Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) appoints all members of 
these regulatory boards, half of the members are nominated by First Nations and 
                                                        
103 Galbraith, Bradshaw and Rutherford, Supra Note 9 at 36.  
104 Part II of the MVRMA establishes the land use planning boards; Part 4 establishes the Mackenzie Valley 
Land and Water Board and Part 5 establishes the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board. 
105 Sections 146-147 (cumulative impact monitoring); Section 148 -150 (environmental monitoring), 
MVRMA. 
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half are nominated by the Governments (federal and territorial).106 In most 
instances, the Chair is appointed by the Federal Minister from persons nominated 
from a majority of the members.107 However, once appointed, all members of the 
Board, including the aboriginal members, have an obligation to act in the broader 
public interest.108 The Federal Minister has the ability to give binding policy 
direction to all three Boards.109  
 
The Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board and the Mackenzie Valley 
Environmental Impact Review Boards are institutions of public government. They 
have the rights and responsibilities that are the forefront of independent 
administrative decision-making. They are granted the powers, rights and privileges 
of a superior court with respect to attendance and examination of witnesses and the 
production and inspection of documents.110 MVRMA Board decisions are subject to 
judicial review by the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories.111  
 
 Most major resource management decisions still require Ministerial approval. 
Aboriginal groups do not have a veto but are given a strong voice in the decision-
making process. In practice, Ministers exercising powers under the MVRMA have 
shown a high degree of deference to decisions made by the Mackenzie Valley 
Boards. There is remarkably little litigation involving the MVRMA brought by the 
Aboriginal groups attesting to the perceived legitimacy of the regime. 
 
3.3.3 Resource Management Boards Under the MVRMA 
 
                                                        
106 Section 36(2) (Gwich’in Land Use Planning Board); Section 38(2) (Sahtu Land Use Planning Board); 
Section 99(4) (Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board); Section 112(2)(Mackenzie Valley 
Environmental Impact Review Board), MVRMA. 
107 Section 12, MVRMA. 
108 Section 9.1, MVRMA establishes that the Boards were created to act in the broader public interest for the 
benefit of residents of the Mackenzie Valley and other Canadians. 
109 Section 83, MVRMA. The Federal Minister was previously only able to give binding policy direction to 
the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board. The April 1, 2014 amendments allow him to 
give policy direction to all MVRMA Boards. 
110 Section 25, MVRMA. 
111 Section 32, MVRMA. 
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Land and Water Regulation  
The Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board (MVLWB) is responsible for regulating 
land and water usage and the deposit of waste within the Mackenzie Valley. Land 
use permits are issued by the MVLWB in accordance with the Mackenzie Valley Land 
Use Regulations.112 Land Use Permits do not require the approval of the Federal or 
Territorial Minister.  
 
The MVLWB is responsible for licensing the use of water and the deposit of waste in 
water. The MVLWB issue Type A water licenses and Type B water licenses after 
public hearings but require the approval of the Federal or Territorial Minister.113 
While the Minister is able to approve or reject the issuance of the license, they are 
not authorized to substitute an alternative decision.  
 
The MVLWB is also responsible for the preliminary screenings of proposals for 
development (where applications for a land use permit or water license are 
submitted) and for referring the matter to the Mackenzie Valley Environmental 
Impact Review Board for environmental assessment where it determines that the 
proposal for development might have a significant adverse impact on the 
environment or might be a cause of public concern. 114 The Gwich’in and Sahtu First 
Nations and the Tli’cho governments also have the power to refer a matter to 
environmental assessment on their own motion if the development occurs in their 
settlement area or might have an impact on their settlement area.115 Environmental 
assessment is a lengthy and costly process for industry and often they would rather 
address the Aboriginal concerns through private contract or elsewhere rather than 
have the matter referred to environmental assessment where the Aboriginal people 
will seek to rely on the MVEIRB’s powers to address their concerns through 
recommended mitigated measures.  
 
                                                        
112 SOR/98-429, Sections 22,23. 
113 Section 72.13, MVRMA. 
114 Section 124, MVRMA. 
115 Section 126(2), MVRMA. 
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Environmental Assessment 
 
Resource development in the Mackenzie Valley is heavily dependent on the process 
of ex ante environmental assessment. This is understandable as many of the 
proposed projects in the northern context are expansive and decisions taken at the 
early stages such as identifying the footprint of the project can have far-reaching 
and irreversible consequences. Environmental assessments must be conducted in 
circumstances where the project may have a significant adverse impact or be a 
cause for public concern.116 Environmental assessments may also be conducted by 
the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board (MVEIRB) on its own 
motion, or by referral by the territorial or federal government or by the Gwich’in or 
Sahtu First Nations, or by the Tli Cho government if the project is within their 
settlement area or likely to impact it.117 Environmental impact reviews are more in 
depth than an environmental assessment and require the appointment of a Review 
Panel.118  
 
The Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board (MVEIRB) is the main 
body in the Mackenzie Valley responsible for the environmental assessment and 
environmental impact review of developments.119 MVEIRB is responsible for 
evaluating the impacts of a development and making recommendations to the 
federal and territorial Governments as to whether or not the project should proceed 
and, if so, what mitigative measures ought to be imposed.120 Environmental 
assessment includes an evaluation of the social, economic and cultural impacts of 
the Project.121 
                                                        
116 Section 125, MVRMA. 
117 Section 126, MVRMA. 
118 Section 132, MVRMA. 
119 Section 114, MVRMA.  
120 Section 128, MVRMA (environmental assessment);Section 134, MVRMA (environmental impact 
review), 
121 Section 115, MVRMA states that the processes established under Part V of the Act must have 
regard to “ (b) the protection of the social, cultural, and economic well being of residents and 
communities in the Mackenzie Valley; and (c) the importance of conservation to the well-being and 
way of life of Aboriginal peoples in Canada to whom Section 35 of the Constitution Act applies, and 
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Ultimate decision-making authority continues to rest with the federal and territorial 
Governments. However, these governments cannot reject the recommendation of 
MVEIRB on environmental assessment without ordering an environmental impact 
review.122 The governments are also required to consult with the MVEIRB if they 
wish to modify any of the recommended mitigative measures.123 Once the 
recommendation is accepted, it becomes binding on all government departments 
and agencies and First Nations.124 
  
The Board process has provisions and practices that allow for Aboriginal 
participation beyond that of other engaged stakeholders. Hearings are frequently 
held in Aboriginal communities with translation provided. Section 115.1 requires 
that the Review Board consider any traditional knowledge and scientific 
information that is related. This section therefore puts Aboriginal traditional 
knowledge (at least theoretically) on par with other scientific data.  
 
The MVEIRB has been very progressive in requiring Aboriginal engagement as part 
of its process and in addressing Aboriginal concerns in its recommendations. 
Industry often prefers to address Aboriginal concerns from the outset rather than 
facing an acrimonious environmental assessment process where mitigations are 
more likely to be imposed on them by MVEIRB without the flexibility to look for 
mutually acceptable solutions with the Aboriginal groups. The environmental 
assessment process, therefore, provides Aboriginal people with significant political 
power and is a major impetus towards developers moving to address Aboriginal 
concerns through private contract. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
who use the Mackenzie Valley.” Section 111, MVRMA defines impact on the environment to include 
“any effect on land, water, air or any other component of the environment, as well as wildlife 
harvesting and includes any effect on the social and cultural environment or on heritage resources.” 
122 Section 130(b), MVRMA. 
123 Section 130, 135, MVRMA. 
124 Section 130(5), MVRMA. 
44 
 
 
 
Land Use Planning 
Land use planning is completed by regional land use planning boards that were 
established as part of the Settled Land Claim processes. Part II of the MVRMA 
establishes the Gwich’in Land Use Planning Board and the Sahtu Land Use Planning 
Board. These Boards are responsible for preparing and adopting a Land Use Plan for 
the Gwich’in and Sahtu Settlement area as well as monitoring implementation of the 
plan, and considering applications for exemptions to the plan where authorized.125 
Land Use Plans must also be approved by the federal and territorial Ministers, both 
of whom have discretion whether to approve the plan or not.126 Once the plan is 
approved then all government, government agencies and First Nations must carry 
out their powers in accordance with the land use plan.127 
 
There are approved land use plans in place for both the Gwich’in and the Sahtu 
Settlement areas. There is also a Tlicho land use plan which applies only to Tlicho 
owned lands, and which is administered separately from the MVRMA regime.  
 
Land use planning is extremely important in making decisions about development 
in a rational manner that is less likely to be impacted by immediate concerns.  
 
The limitation of the land use planning under the MVRMA is that it only applies to 
settlement lands. The Northwest Territories Protected Areas Strategy (PAS) is the 
missing piece. PAS was conceived as a comprehensive land use planning exercise 
designed to take place outside of the MVRMA structure but nevertheless informing 
MVRMA decision makers about land use decisions for the entire NWT. The PAS 
outlines a community-based process to establish a network of protected areas 
within each of the 45 ecoregions within the NWT. The PAS was signed in 1999 and 
contains representation from regional Aboriginal organizations, the Federal and 
Territorial governments, environmental non-governmental organizations and 
                                                        
125 Section 41, 44 MVRMA 
126 Section 43, MVRMA 
127 Section 46, MVRMA 
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industry.128 The PAS has been relatively inactive in recent years, but it is anticipated 
that the process may be revitalized after devolution when the GNWT assumes full 
control over the administration of the PAS.129 The PAS process is extremely 
important for adaptive management because it is a multi-stakeholder forum and it 
allows for ongoing and adaptive land use planning.  
 
Cumulative Impacts Monitoring Program 
Another important co-management initiative under the MVRMA is the Cumulative 
Impacts Monitoring Program (CIMP). The monitoring program is an obligation 
contained in the Sahtu, Gwich’in and Tlicho comprehensive land claim 
agreements130 as well as a statutory requirement under Part 6 of the MVRMA. The 
CIMP is a source of environmental monitoring and research. The program was 
established in 1999 and coordinates, conducts, and funds the collection, analysis, 
and reporting of information related to environmental conditions in the NWT. It is 
particularly focused on cumulative impacts and environmental trends.131 From an 
adaptive management point of view, it is extremely progressive to have this type of 
feedback loop expressly stated in the legislation and given further legal weight 
because of its inclusion in the land claim agreements. 
 
Section 146 of the MVRMA requires the federal and territorial governments to 
collect and analyze scientific data, traditional knowledge, and other pertinent 
information for the purpose of monitoring cumulative impacts.  
 
CIMP is an important tool for ensuring that Aboriginal traditional knowledge, as 
well as other scientific data is gathered and made available to decision-makers so 
that they may evaluate cumulative impacts and make decisions that are adaptive 
                                                        
128 For more information, see the PAS website online at www.nwtpas.ca. 
129 Prior to devolution, PAS was administered by AANDC and GNWT collectively. After devolution, the 
PAS is administered by the GNWT and expertise that was in AANDC will now be housed within the 
GNWT.  
130Supra, Note 37.  
131 “NWT CIMP” available on the Government of the Northwest Territories website at 
http://www.enr.gov.nt.ca/programs/nwt-cimp 
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and informed by changing conditions as witnessed and understood by the 
Aboriginal groups that live there. The CIMP has adopted a community-based 
approach to monitoring and places considerable emphasis on aboriginal traditional 
knowledge.132  
 
Unfortunately, funding for the CIMP program has been inconsistent. Neil McCrank, 
the Minister’s Special Representative for the Northern Regulatory Improvement 
Initiative recommended in his influential report that that the Federal Government 
commit to the CIMP and that it specifically commit funds for this purpose.133 The 
GNWT has assumed responsibility for CIMP following devolution and appears to be 
placing increased resources into the program.134  
 
3.4 Concluding Comments 
The 2010 Northwest Territories Environmental Audit found that the Land and Water 
Boards and the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board were 
generally effective in protecting the environment.135 As conventionally understood, 
the MVRMA is doing a respectable job of environmental management on operational 
matters. It includes rigorous environmental assessment and licensing processes that 
are generally applied in a consistent and fair manner. The co-management structure 
allows for significant Aboriginal participation both in the hearing process and as 
members of the Boards. Aboriginal traditional knowledge is an important 
component in decision-making. However, some of the more adaptive components of 
the MVRMA, particularly cumulative impacts monitoring, and some aspects of land 
                                                        
132 Ibid. 
133 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Road to Improvement: The Review of the Regulatory Systems 
Across the North by Neil McCrank (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 
2008) recommendation number 5 at 22 (the McCrank Report). 
134In 2016, the Government of the Northwest Territories published the NWT CIMP Action Plan 2016-
2020 available on line at www.enr.gov.nt.ca/programs/nwt-cimp/about-us. 
135 Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada and Federal Interlocutor for Metis and Non-
Status Indians, 2010 Northwest Territories Environment Audit, (Ottawa: AANDC, March 2011). Section 
148 of the MVRMA requires an independent environmental audit every five years and sets out the 
requirements for that audit. 
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use planning have not been operationalized. The MVRMA relies heavily on 
environmental assessment and up-front decision-making (the tools of engineering 
resilience) and provides insufficient focus on monitoring and follow-up (the tools of 
ecological resilience).  
 
The next chapter discusses how private contracts have developed outside of the 
MVRMA to address Aboriginal and other stakeholder interests. These private 
contracts sometimes increase the overall flexibility and adaptability of the 
regulatory system and provide an important value enhancement in support of 
adaptive management. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4 ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
This chapter discusses environmental agreements, which are the contractual 
instrument most commonly used to regulate the environmental impacts of large 
northern projects. The content of environmental agreements varies but they can be 
broadly defined as negotiated and enforceable contracts dealing with environmental 
matters. Environmental agreements are primarily aimed at promoting the 
environmental integrity of the Project. They address Aboriginal participation issues 
and build social license for the Project. This is different from impact benefit 
agreements and socio-economic agreements, which are primarily concerned with 
the distribution of wealth and benefits from the Project. It is not uncommon to have 
all three of these Agreements associated with the same Project.  
 
The purpose of this section is not to discuss the individual environmental 
agreements in detail but to focus on the importance of environmental agreements in 
establishing independent monitoring agencies as key players in the Mackenzie 
Valley regulatory regime and in promoting increased Aboriginal involvement in 
environmental regulation. 
 
4.1 History of Environmental Agreements in the Mackenzie Valley 
Environmental agreements in the Mackenzie Valley developed in tandem with the 
Canadian diamond mining industry. Canada first became a diamond producer when 
the Ekati diamond mine opened in the Mackenzie Valley in 1998. By 2003, Canada 
had become the world’s third largest diamond producer. Ekati’s average production 
over its 20-year life is expected to be 3 to 5 million carats per year or in other terms, 
approximately about 3% of the world diamond production by volume. Diavik 
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Diamond Mine started production in 2003 and is expected to peak at 11 million 
carats per year, representing about 6% of the world supply. Snap Lake Diamond 
Mine was the only completely underground diamond mine in the Mackenzie Valley 
and did not fare nearly as well. It opened in 2008 and produced for seven years 
without turning a profit before being placed into care in maintenance in 2016. 
Gahcho Kue diamond mine is slated to begin production in the last quarter of 2016. 
It is expected to have an output of about 4.5 million carats per year over its twelve-
year life span.136 
The diamond mines are extremely important for the northern economy.   Natural 
Resources Canada asserts that the Canadian diamond mining industry employs 
approximately 2,650 people in mine operations and another 1,500 in support 
industries (maintenance, catering and transport).  Aboriginal persons generally 
make up 30 to 40 per cent of the mining work force.137  
Environmental agreements were negotiated to address the environmental impacts 
of these massive, high-value diamond mines being developed over a relatively short 
time period in the pristine arctic wilderness. This was a driver for both Industry and 
Aboriginal groups who were motivated to find novel solutions to environmental 
issues in order to capitalize on these economic opportunities. Environmental 
Agreements subsequently became the norm for large projects in the Mackenzie 
Valley. 
Several Aboriginal groups in the Mackenzie Valley had recently completed 
Comprehensive Land Claim Agreements with the Federal Government when the 
time came to negotiate the Environmental Agreements and Impact Benefit 
Agreements for the diamond mines. The Gwich’in Comprehensive Land Claim 
Agreement, Sahtu Dene and Metis Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement, and 
Tlicho Comprehensive Land Claim Agreements were signed in 1992, 1993 and 2003, 
                                                        
136 Natural Resources Canada, Canada: A Diamond Producing Nation last modified March 31, 2016 
and available online at www.nrcan.gc.ca/mining-materials/diamonds/15972. (Natural Resources 
Canada); and Diamond Mines in Canada available online at Geology.com.  
137Ibid, Natural Resources Canada. 
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respectively.138 These Aboriginal groups were experienced negotiators and were 
well-equipped to negotiate environmental agreements with the large multi-national 
diamond companies. It should also be noted that diamonds were first discovered in 
the NWT in the mid-1980s and the potential resource potential of the North, 
particularly the diamond and oil and gas resource potential, was an important 
stimulus to the negotiations of the Comprehensive Land Claim Agreements. 
 
The first environmental agreement negotiated in the Mackenzie Valley was for the 
Ekati diamond mine operated by BHP Diamond Company in 1997. 139 
Environmental agreements were also negotiated in fairly quick succession for the 
Diavik (2000)140, and Snap Lake diamond mines (2004).141 Each of these 
environmental agreements established independent monitoring agencies for their 
respective Project funded by industry. The Monitoring agencies had two distinct 
functions: (1) to perform an independent oversight role with responsibilities for 
reviewing and commenting on technical data; and (2) to promote aboriginal 
participation in environmental monitoring and follow-up. The environmental 
agreements also filled a regulatory gap with regards to financial security for 
remediation of environmental harm.142  
 
A review of academic literature on this topic demonstrates considerable interest 
when the environmental agreements were signed for the Ekati, Diavik and Snap 
Lake mines and then relatively little interest in the environmental agreements for 
subsequent projects. This paper reviews the academic literature on the Ekati, Diavik 
                                                        
138 Land Claim Agreements, Supra, Note 87. 
139 The Ekati Environmental Agreement is available at 
monitoringageny.net/ResourceCentre/Environmental Agreement/tabid/87/Default.aspx. 
140 The Diavik Environmental Agreement is available online at 
emab.ca/Portals/0/Documents/diavik_enviro_agree.pdf.  
141 The Snap Lake Environmental Agreement is available online at 
slema.ca/documents/misc.documents/2004/DeBeers-Final-Environmental-Agreement. 
142The Government of the Northwest Territories has recently assumed control of the security 
deposits previously held by the federal government and has established a new office to oversee 
securities for mining and gas activities. Soon there may no longer be a need to address security issues 
in environmental agreements. See Richard, Gleeson, “NWT Mine Securities – ‘a work in progress’, 
officials say”, CBC (14 November 2014) online: www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north. 
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and Snap Lake diamond mine projects and then discusses recent developments in 
environmental agreements arising from the Gahcho Kue diamond mine project and 
the Giant mine Remediation Project.  
 
Over time, there has been a shift away from scientific and technical oversight to an 
increased focus on the role of Aboriginal engagement. This engagement includes the 
monitoring and follow-up process as well as areas of particular areas of interest to 
the Aboriginal population. The Giant Mine Remediation Project environmental 
agreement is an interesting study which arose from a particular set of historical 
circumstances and which allows for the inclusion of a Non-Government 
Organization as part of the environmental agreement for the first time.143  
 
The environmental agreements for Ekati, Diavik and Snap Lake diamond mines set 
out a series of guiding principles that identify key environmental goals. These 
principles include adaptive management, the precautionary principle and the 
importance of considering both traditional knowledge combined with scientific 
information. The Diavik and Snap Lake environmental agreements specifically 
identify sustainable development as a guiding principle.144  
 
The Giant Mine Remediation Project environmental agreement has a much different 
context and sustainable development is arguably not applicable in the context of 
remediation. The Giant Mine Remediation Project environmental agreement 
identifies adaptive management and the importance of considering both traditional 
knowledge and western science as guiding principles.145 These guiding principles 
are potentially important in constructing the environmental coordinating 
framework for the Mackenzie Valley.  There is a noticeable lack of provisions in the 
                                                        
143 The Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Agreement signed June 17, 2015 is available 
online at www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1434642382836/1434642437416. 
144 Ekati, Diavik and Snap Lake Environmental Agreements, Section 1.2 – Guiding Principles. It is 
interesting that the section number is the same in all three agreements suggesting a template 
approach. 
145 Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Agreement, Section 2.4  
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environmental agreements that attempt to establish environmental priorities based 
on Dene values. 
 
4.2 The Environmental Agreements146 
 
4.2.1 Ekati Environmental Agreement 
 
The Ekati Environmental Agreement was the first environmental agreement 
negotiated in the Mackenzie Valley. This agreement was negotiated by the 
Government of Canada, the Government of the Northwest Territories, and BHP 
Diamond Company (BHP).  
 
The Ekati Agreement establishes an Independent  Environmental Monitoring 
Agency (IEMA). 147 IEMA consists of seven directors, four of whom are nominated by 
Aboriginal groups. IEMA is intended to provide independent advice to both BHP and 
the federal and territorial government on environmental matters. There is no 
obligation on either BHP or the federal or territorial governments to follow the 
advice yet, there is enhanced accountability as the parties must provide reasons if 
they fail to follow IEMA’s recommendations. The Aboriginal groups are not parties 
to the environmental agreement and therefore have no ability to enforce the 
provisions of the environmental agreement in contract law.  
 
BHP is required to file an annual environmental impact report that evaluates the 
ongoing impacts of the operations and the effectiveness of the mitigation measures 
already in place. BHP must also file an updated environmental management plan 
that addresses BHP’s plan to address environmental impacts moving forward. These 
reports are reviewed by IEMA, which then has the responsibility to advise the 
                                                        
146 For an excellent discussion of the Ekati, Diavik and Snap Lake Agreements see Ciaran 
O’Faircheallaigh, Environmental Agreements in Canada: Aboriginal Participation, EIA Follow-Up and 
Environmental Management of Major Projects (Calgary: Canadian Institute of Resources Law, 2006) at 
pages 11-48. This section relies very heavily on O’Faircheallaigh for the discussion of the Ekati, Diavik 
and Snap Lake Environmental Agreements. 
147 Ekati Environmental Agreement, Article 4. 
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federal and territorial governments on the sufficiency of the reports. These 
governments have the authority to require that BHP remedy deficiencies in the 
Environmental Impact Report and Environmental Management Plans. They can also 
access security monies to remedy any deficiencies that BHP fails to address.148 
 
4.2.2 Diavik Environmental Agreement 
 
The Diavik Agreement was negotiated by the Government of Canada, the 
Government of the Northwest Territories, Diavik Diamond Mines Inc. (Diavik), and 
five Aboriginal groups.149 As parties to the Diavik environmental agreement, the 
Aboriginal groups have the legal ability to enforce their rights under the 
environmental agreement, a circumstance which was noticeably absent in the Ekati 
environmental agreement. 
 
The Diavik environmental agreement establishes another parallel Environmental 
Monitoring Advisory Board (EMAB).150 EMAB operates in an advisory capacity to 
review the Reports provided by Diavik and provides recommendations to both 
Diavik and the federal and territorial governments. Board membership consists of 
one representative nominated individually by each of the five Aboriginal groups, the 
federal government, the territorial government and Diavik.151 The EMAB also 
contains security arrangements and conditions by which the federal and territorial 
governments can access security monies to remedy any deficiencies that Diavik fails 
to address.152 
 
                                                        
148 Ekati Environmental Agreement, Article 9. 
149 Aboriginal parties to the Diavik Environmental Agreement are Dogrib Treaty 11 Council, Lutsel 
K’e Dene Band, Yellowknives Dene First Nation, North Slave Metis Alliance and Kitikmeot Inuit 
Association. 
150 Diavik Environmental Agreement, Article 4. 
151 Diavik Environmental Agreement Article 4.5, There are provisions for participation on the Board by the 
Government of Nunavut or for members to appoint public representatives that could include environmental 
interest groups, although these provisions have not been utilized.  
152 Diavik Environmental Agreement, Article 15. 
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O’Faircheallaigh identifies two key differences between IEMA, the monitoring 
agency established under the Ekati environmental agreement and EMAB. EMAB 
places increased emphasis on its community liaison role and less emphasis on its 
oversight role. EMAB members tend to have more experience in community 
leadership and public administration and less experience in the scientific and 
technical aspects of environmental regulation. This presumably reflects the 
perceived need to encourage more Aboriginal and community input into the 
monitoring and follow-up process153 and perhaps more faith in the MVRMA boards 
to competently address the scientific and technical issues. 
 
 Secondly, IEMA provides very detailed assessments on a wide range of 
environmental issues. EMAB places increased emphasis on identifying and 
monitoring areas of key interest and importance to Aboriginal board members and 
Aboriginal communities. On most other environmental issues, EMAB is more 
deferential to the regulatory authorities. EMAB provides more general oversight to 
ensure that the relevant regulatory authorities are adequately performing their 
regulatory role particularly with regards to monitoring and follow-up but is less 
likely than IEMA to duplicate existing regulatory processes.154  
 
4.2.3 Snap Lake Environmental Agreement 
 
The Snap Lake Environmental Agreement was signed by the Government of Canada, 
the Government of the Northwest Territories, four Aboriginal groups, and De Beers 
Canada Mining Inc. (De Beers).155 The Environmental Agreement established the 
Snap Lake Environmental Monitoring Agency (SLEMA), which also operates in an 
advisory capacity to both De Beers and federal and territorial governments to 
review the reports and provide recommendations.156  
                                                        
153 O’Faircheallaigh, Supra Note 146 at 32 -33. 
154 Ibid. at 34 
155 Aboriginal Parties to the Snap Lake EA include Dogrib Treaty 11 Council, Lutsel K’e Dene Band, 
Yellowknives Dene Frist Nation and the North Slave Metis Alliance.  
156 Snap Lake Environmental Agreement, Article 4.  
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 The Snap Lake Environmental Agreement gives the Aboriginal groups much greater 
control over the operations of the monitoring agency that the previous 
environmental agreements. SLEMA consists of four components: (1) a Core Group of 
representatives from each of the four Aboriginal Parties to the Snap Lake 
Environmental Agreement and not government or industry; (2) a Science and 
Technical Panel; (3) two traditional knowledge working groups; and (4) a 
Secretariat. The Core Group is responsible for the overall governance of SLEMA. This 
means that the work priorities and the process of SLEMA is largely set by the 
Aboriginal signatories to the environmental agreement. 
 
All of the commitments made by De Beers during the Snap Lake Environmental 
Assessment process are attached as a Schedule to the Snap Lake Environmental 
Agreement.157 Arguably, this allows the Aboriginal parties who are signatories to the 
Snap Lake Environmental Agreement to take legal action under the environmental 
agreement to enforce De Beer’s commitments made during the course of the 
environmental assessment rather than relying solely on the regulator. The federal 
and territorial governments are able to access De Beers’s Security Deposits to 
remedy a deficiency. 158 This creates a regulatory home for environmental 
assessment provisions that fall outside other regulatory permits, and perhaps leads 
to a more efficient enforcement of those provisions. 
 
The Snap Lake Agreement contemplated the merging of the three environmental 
monitoring agencies. The agreement acknowledges the cumulative impacts of the 
three mines including the possible cost and workload efficiencies that could be 
realized by not maintaining three separate bureaucratic structures performing 
similar work in the same area. However, resistance from the other diamond 
companies to such a merger has made this approach unfeasible. This left the Snap 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
157 Snap Lake Environmental Agreement, Article 5.3. 
158 Snap Lake Environmental Agreement, Article 12. 
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Lake Environmental Monitoring Agency (SLEMA), which was intended to be a 
temporary agency, with a funding deficit which the three big diamond companies 
collectively have been unwilling to address.159 It also left a gap in terms of 
addressing the cumulative impacts of diamond mining in the north.  
 
The Snap Lake Mine was placed into care and maintenance on December 4, 2016 
citing falling commodity prices and ongoing water issues at the mine site. 160 
 
4.2.4 Gahcho Kue Mine– Ni Hadi Yati 
 
The Gahcho Kue Mine does not have an environmental agreement. Instead, the 
Aboriginal groups and Industry put forward a novel alternative, which they termed 
Ni Hadi Yati.  
 
The proposal for Ni Hadi Yati was presented to the Mackenzie Valley Environmental 
Impact Review Board (MVEIRB) during the environmental assessment of the 
Gahcho Kue diamond mine in a joint submission made by four Aboriginal groups 
and De Beers Canada Inc.161 Ni Hadi Yati translates to “Words that Watch the Land” 
or “People Watching the Land Together”. It is intended as a legally binding 
contractual agreement between the Aboriginal groups and De Beers and does not 
include the federal or territorial governments. 
 
 Ni Hadi Yati is largely an engagement mechanism between the Aboriginal groups 
and De Beers intended to last for the life of the Project. It allows the Aboriginal 
groups to identify their technical review needs and access technical review 
expertise. The goal is to allow the Aboriginal groups to be more meaningfully 
informed on specific areas of interest.  
                                                        
159 Affolder, Supra Note 10 at 169. 
160 “NWT’s Snap Lake Diamond Mine halts Operations, Debeers Says” CBC (4 December 2015) online: 
www.cbc.ca. 
161 Letter from the Deninu Kue First Nation, Tlicho Government, Lutsel K’e Dene First Nation, 
Yellowknife Dene First Nation, and De Beers Canada Inc. to Chuck Hubert, Senior Environmental 
Assessment Offices, MVEIRB dated December 20, 2012 and available online at www.reviewboard.ca 
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Ni Hadi Yati does not establish an independent oversight body nor does it 
contemplate an independent enforcement role for the Aboriginal groups. It is 
intended to ensure that participating Aboriginal groups are well placed to inform 
and engage within existing regulatory processes and to establish an ongoing 
working relationship between Industry and Aboriginal groups. While Ni Hadi Yati 
did not specify a role for the federal or territorial governments, it was clearly 
anticipated that government departments would actively participate by lending 
their technical expertise in support of Ni Hadi Yati.  
 
The Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board (MVEIRB) accepted the 
role of Ni Hadi Yati in mitigating the environmental impacts of the project. MVEIRB 
did not address Ni Hadi Yati in its identification of binding mitigation measures 
because the Aboriginal parties and the developer had already committed to 
negotiate a contract to implement Ni Hadi Yati and government agencies had 
committed to contributing technical expertise at the hearing.162 This approach was 
criticized by all four of the Aboriginal groups who advocated a more direct link to 
the regulatory process with a provision in place to address alternatives should 
negotiation of a future Agreement between De Beers and the Aboriginal groups 
prove unsuccessful.163 The Aboriginal groups were in support of the proposal put 
forward at the hearing but they felt that they needed the ongoing threat of the 
exercise of regulatory power in order to bolster their negotiating powers and 
ensure implementation of the proposal. To this author’s knowledge, no formal 
agreement for Ni Hadi Yati had been entered into. It may simply be that it is a 
private Agreement and therefore not publicly available, which also raises questions 
regarding transparency and accountability when it is addressing mitigations to 
environmental impacts identified at a public hearing.  
                                                        
162 Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board, “Report of Environmental Impact Review and 
Reasons for Decision: EIR 0607-001 Gahcho Kue Diamond Mine Project”, July 19, 2013 available online: 
www.reviewboard.ca/upload/project_document/EA0505-008_Report_of_Environmental_Assessment.pdf 
at 159.  
163 Meagan Wohlberg, “First Nations ask minister to put brakes on Gahcho Kue, Northern Journal 26 
August, 2013. 
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4.2.5 Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Agreement 
 
Between 1948 and 2004, Giant Mine was a major economic driver for Yellowknife 
and the Northwest Territories. It was a very profitable gold mine and for decades, 
the primary employer in the City of Yellowknife. Unfortunately, it is also the most 
contaminated site in Canada. When the mine closed and the company went 
bankrupt, attention focused on the environmental issues left behind, notably the 
237,000 tons of arsenic trioxide stored in the underground chambers. 164 Arsenic 
trioxide is a lethal by-product of extracting ore from gold and is highly toxic. 
Remediation efforts at the mine site are estimated to cost approximately one billion 
dollars.165 Giant Mine had environmental issues throughout the life of the project, 
particularly related to air and water quality. It has left a legacy of mistrust and anger 
with the Aboriginal groups in the NWT, particularly the Yellowknives Dene First 
Nation who lived in close proximity to the mine site and were disproportionately 
affected by the environmental impacts while not benefiting from the wealth 
generated from the mine. 166  
 
The Giant Mine remediation efforts have resulted in an environmental agreement 
that was signed not only with the Aboriginal groups but also with several other 
stakeholders including a major northern environmental public interest group. It 
established another monitoring agency with oversight responsibilities for the 
remediation. 
 
At the environmental assessment hearing, the Mackenzie Valley Environmental 
Impact Review Board (MVEIRB) was concerned by a lack of confidence in the 
federal remediation team. This lack of confidence was expressed by the 
                                                        
164 Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “Giant Mine Remediation Project” available online at 
www.aandc.gc.ca/eng/110010027364/1100100027365. 
165 The Economist, “Giant Headache”, (27 September 2014) online: www.economist.com. 
166 Yellowknives Dene (2005), “Impact of the Giant Mine on Yellowknives Dene” Dettah: Yellowknives 
Dene First Nation Council available online at www.mvlwb.ca/Boards/mv/Registry/2007/MV2007L8-
0030/remediationplan/Giant%20Mine%20/TJ%20Report%20YKDFN.pdf 
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Yellowknives Dene First Nation and other community groups. This lack of 
confidence stemmed from the federal government playing a dual role in the 
remediation both as the proponent of the project and as a key regulator which key 
stakeholders/rightsholders felt resulted in a lack of independent oversight. 167 
 
To address this issue, MVEIRB recommended in its environmental assessment 
report that the Government of Canada and the Government of the Northwest 
Territories negotiate a legally binding environmental agreement in order to create 
an independent oversight body. MVEIRB identified that the activities of the 
oversight body were to include: (1) monitoring the developers’ activities, (2) 
considering the adequacy of funding for the Project and ongoing research, (3) 
providing advice to the Developer, regulators and government on monitoring and 
mitigation, and (4) sharing the oversight body’s conclusions with the general public 
and potentially affected communities in a culturally appropriate manner. They 
stated that membership on the oversight committee should include, not only 
affected Aboriginal groups, but also the environmental public interest group, 
Alternatives North. 168 MVEIRB’s recommendation was initially not well received by 
federal government but was ultimately accepted and implemented.169  
 
The Giant Mine Remediation Project environmental agreement was signed on June 
17, 2015 with an established budget for the Oversight Body of $900,000.00 per 
year.170 The environmental agreement establishes a broader coalition of 
stakeholders participating in the oversight body including the City of Yellowknife, 
Yellowknives Dene First Nation, North Slave Metis, and Alternatives North. This 
demonstrates the capacity of environmental agreements to incorporate more 
diverse interests and perspectives, especially from the environmental movement. It 
remains to be seen whether that potential creativity will be realized or undermined 
                                                        
167 MVEIRB Gahcho Kue Report, Supra Note 162 at 81 and 82. 
168 Ibid. Measures 7 and 8 at 93. 
169 Meagan Wohlberg “Ministers Accept Giant Mine Clean-up Measures. Ignore Project Team 
Complaints”, Northern Journal (13 January, 2014) online: norj.ca. 
170 Giant Mine Environmental Agreement, Article 11. Funding consists of $650,000.00 general 
operating budget and $250,000.00 in research funding. 
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by the heavy bureaucratic structure also established by the environmental 
agreement.  
 
4.3 Advantages of Environmental Agreements 
 
4.3.1 Environmental Agreements Address Weaknesses in The Environmental 
Assessment System Particularly in Monitoring and Follow-Up. 
 
One of the key benefits of environmental agreements is that they have the potential 
to address weaknesses in the implementation and enforcement mechanisms in the 
existing regulatory system. This is important due to the heavy reliance on predictive 
modeling and up-front decision-making (engineering resilience) inherent in 
environmental assessment. This model of decision-making is increasingly unreliable 
in an unstable arctic ecosystem and it is important to strengthen the monitoring and 
follow-up capacity of the system to ensure that modeling assumptions are 
challenged, and where proven incorrect, corrective action is taken.  
 
 Galbraith, Bradshaw and Rutherford identify several deficiencies in the 
environmental assessment regime in the Mackenzie Valley including: (1) a failure to 
employ adequate project-specific follow up, (2) a failure to garner adequate trust 
among stakeholders; and (3) a lack of capacity for public participation. They argue 
convincingly that all of these issues can potentially be addressed through 
Environmental Agreements.171  
 
O’Faircheallaigh notes that environmental agreements are important because they 
allow for follow-up on predicted impacts through mechanisms like Aboriginal 
monitoring programs. He argues that the need for these kinds of checks on 
predicted impacts is fundamentally important because environmental assessments 
rely heavily on environmental predictions which are by necessity based on 
probabilities and therefore, lack certainty. The up-front decision making is designed 
                                                        
171 Galbraith, Bradshaw and Rutherford, Supra Note 9 at 36. 
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to allow the decision maker to make as informed a decision as possible in advance of 
the project but can never be entirely accurate.172 He notes elsewhere that follow-up 
is critical to adaptive management particularly when dealing with complex, 
dynamic, environmental and social systems with impacts that are difficult to 
predict.173  
 
Another key benefit of environmental agreements is that they are pragmatic and can 
allow for greater flexibility than the legislative regime. Affolder conducted an 
extensive review of the Ekati Environmental Agreement and concluded that the 
main benefit of environmental contracting is that it provides the ability to initiate “a 
fix” in small bite-size chunks rather than addressing a gap in the regulatory system, 
which is often politically unviable.174 It is also worth noting that these “bite-size” 
changes may be initiated by Aboriginal groups who can instigate the small fix but 
not the broader legislative solution. A good example of a small fix might be the 
decision to address securities in the environmental agreements rather than wait for 
a legislative solution for the Mackenzie Valley.  
 
O’Faircheallaigh argues that the decentralized decision-making process in 
environmental agreements creates opportunities for learning and adaptation within 
the regulatory system. Parties then have the flexibility to combine elements of 
different approaches and institutional designs in addressing specific concerns.175  
 
Affolder challenges this assumption, arguing that there is little evidence that the 
environmental agreements promote flexibility and creativity. Instead, she holds that 
environmental agreements often create highly bureaucratic structures which are 
detrimental to this kind of experimentalism.176 However, Affolder based her 
                                                        
172 Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, “Making social assessment count: a negotiation-based approach for indigenous 
peoples” (1999) 12:1 Society and Natural Resources 63 as quoted in Galbraith Bradshaw and Rutherford 
Ibid. at 29.  
173 O’Faircheallaigh, Supra Note 146 at 2. 
174 Affolder, Supra Note 10 at 180. 
175 O’Faircheallaigh, Supra Note 146 at 74. 
176 Affolder, Supra Note 10 at 180. 
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research primarily on the Ekati experience whereas some of the more creative 
experiments with the environmental agreements are the relatively recent Ni Hadi 
Yati (Gahcho Kue) and the Giant Mine Remediation Project environmental 
agreement.  
 
My review of the five main environmental agreements suggests that there is room 
for experimentalism and creativity in addressing monitoring and follow-up. There is 
definitely an evolution in the agreements as they move away from an expansive 
watch-dog function that often duplicates the role of the MVRMA boards and other 
regulators to a more defined role that is more responsive to the particular concerns 
and priorities identified by Aboriginal parties. Ni Hadi Yati broke from the 
monitoring agency model altogether and remains an important experiment in 
alternative models. 
 
4.3.2 Environmental Agreements allow for the development of a community based 
forum and encourage Aboriginal participation. 
 
Environmental agreements provide a community-based forum for reviewing the 
project and establishes a formal relationship between stakeholders and the 
Industry. Kennett conducted in-depth interviews of key stakeholders/rightsholders 
involved with the BHP and Diavik Environmental Agreements. He notes that most of 
the stakeholders/rightsholders that he interviewed felt that the existing regulatory 
regime was not particularly well-suited for this type of collaborative community-
based forum and that environmental agreements were helpful in addressing this 
issue.177  
 
O’Faircheallaigh argues that the need for a community-based forum is particularly 
important for Aboriginal communities because of their historic marginalization 
from environmental management of the lands and resources located in their 
                                                        
177 S.A. Kennet “Project Specific Environmental Agreements in the NWT: Review of Issues and 
Options.” (Calgary: Canadian Institute of Resources Law, 2001) at 7-8. (fix this). 
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traditional territories.178 Environmental agreements formalize Aboriginal 
participation and ensure access to the technical expertise that they need in order to 
effectively participate at the regulatory stage as well as provides a remedy for lack 
of Aboriginal involvement in the on-going decision-making process once the 
environmental assessment is completed.  
 
Affolder writes that environmental agreements have an important role in 
addressing issues of stakeholder/rightsholder confidence in the process. She notes 
that the multiple and conflicting roles can undermine a government’s ability to 
operate as an environmental regulator, and has created the public perception that 
independent oversight is required. The need for an independent player stems from 
the government acting as a regulator when it plays a role in attracting mining 
investment and benefits financially from investment in the North.179 This lack of 
stakeholder/rightsholder confidence was particularly evident in the Giant Mine 
contaminated site clean-up where the federal and territorial governments were also 
the project’s proponent. MVEIRB identified this as a key reason why it 
recommended that an environmental agreement be developed for the clean-up.180 
 
Aboriginal groups have been successful in using environmental agreements to 
establish a direct relationship with Industry and to expand their role in the ongoing 
monitoring and mitigation of projects that is not afforded to them in the 
conventional regulatory process and which fits with their aspirations for co-
management and self-government. Ni Hadi Yati clearly demonstrated that the 
Aboriginal groups saw their ongoing relationship with the diamond company as a 
primary benefit of the environmental agreement and were willing to depart from 
the agency structure developed in the first environmental agreements (Ekati, Diavik 
and Snap Lake) in favour of a more collaborative model. This is also reflective of the 
                                                        
178 O’Faircheallaigh, Supra Note 146 at 1. 
179 Affolder, Supra Note 10 at 160. 
180 MVEIRB Giant Mine Report, Supra Note 162 at 81 and 82. 
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confidence of the Aboriginal group in the MVRMA boards to fulfill their regulatory 
role. 
 
One of the most exciting developments is the inclusion of Alternatives North, a 
prominent northern environmental NGO, as a party to the Giant Mine Remediation 
Project environmental agreement. The Giant Mine Remediation Project 
environmental agreement brings Alternatives North into the dialogue in an official 
and legal capacity as they are signatories to the environmental agreement. An 
effective regulatory regime in the North must include all 
stakeholders/rightsholders, including the NGOs. The northern environmental 
movement will be important players in constructing an environmental vision for the 
Mackenzie Valley. It should be noted that this expanded conversation among 
stakeholders/rightsholders was also happening in a less official capacity as Kevin 
O’Reilly was the Executive Director of IEMA (Ekati) for many years and also a 
prominent member of the Yellowknife-based Environmental NGO Ecology North.181 
 
4.4 Disadvantages of Environmental Agreements 
The primary criticism of the northern environmental agreements is the proliferation 
of stand-alone monitoring agencies and their associated bureaucratic structures.182 
These types of monitoring agencies are costly to maintain and the bureaucratic 
structures can make it difficult to respond quickly and appropriately as issues arise. 
The Snap Lake Environmental Agreement contemplated a regional structure for all 
of the diamond mines. When that regional structure did not emerge, it undermined 
the sustainability of the independent agency approach as well as the ability of the 
stand-alone monitoring agencies to address cumulative effects.  
 
Affolder notes that the independent monitoring agencies have done a reasonable job 
of environmental monitoring but they have failed to achieve transformational levels 
                                                        
181Mr. O’Reilly is currently sitting as a Member of the Legislative Assembly representing the Range 
Lake riding in Yellowknife.  
182 Kennett, Supra Note 177 at 6.  
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of aboriginal participation in environmental management.183 The agenda for 
independent monitoring and follow-up is increasingly set by Aboriginal groups. 
While less focus is now being placed on the technical aspects of monitoring and 
follow-up, the trend is to concentrate more on Aboriginal participation and 
identification of issues. There may be an irreconcilable tension between the “watch 
dog” functions of the independent monitoring agencies and the participatory and 
collaborative goals of Aboriginal peoples.  
 
Another key criticism of environmental agreements is that they may undermine the 
regulatory system and distort the lines of regulatory authority. This is addressed in 
detail below. 
 
4.5 How Environmental Agreements Interact with the MVRMA 
Regulatory Process 
The interaction of environmental agreements with the MVRMA regulatory process is 
complex. In reviewing the process, it is clear that the environmental agreements are 
not voluntary.184 The expectation of MVEIRB that companies engage with Aboriginal 
groups to address impacts has legitimized the use of environmental agreements by 
Industry.185 Additionally, the MVEIRB frequently uses the environmental 
assessment process to compel companies to enter into environmental agreements 
as was evidenced in the Snap Lake and Giant Mine Environmental assessment 
processes. Those cases resulted in a recommendation from MVEIRB for an 
environmental agreement, which was ultimately accepted by the Responsible 
Ministers and became a condition of approval of the Project. The Aboriginal groups 
expressed concerns that they are less able to negotiate a strong environmental 
agreement for Gahcho Kue mine because MVEIRB had not required the negotiation 
                                                        
183 Affolder, Supra Note 10 at 178. Affolder refers specifically to the Ekati Environmental Agreement but 
her comments also apply to the Diavik and Snap Lake Environmental Agreements. 
184 Affolder, Supra Note 10 at 71-172 provides additional argument why environmental agreements are not 
voluntary.  
185Graben, Supra Note 14 at 206-207. Graben argues that the MVEIRB successfully uses its rule making 
powers in order to promote private agreements.  
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of an environmental agreement as part of the terms of approval and had not 
identified regulatory alternatives to a negotiated environmental agreement.  
 
One of the key concerns with environmental agreements is that they could serve to 
undermine the regulatory system by allowing issues that should be confronted and 
remedied within the regulatory system to be addressed through environmental 
agreements.186 Kennett interviewed a number of key stakeholders/rightsholders 
who noted that proponent commitments are best enforced through established 
regulatory instruments and processes, and that the inability of the regulatory 
system to identify and capture undertakings should be addressed through changes 
to the regulatory system and not through environmental agreements.187  
 
Affolder argues that the reliance on environmental agreements may actually be 
stifling the creativity of the regulators to address issues within the established 
regulatory system. 188 She believes that the Land and Water Board is more effective 
in ensuring compliance particularly when dealing with smaller breaches because it 
has more tools at its disposal including the ability to stop work or withdraw 
licenses.189 The Land and Water Boards are also independent tribunals operating at 
arm’s length from government and therefore are less influenced by political 
considerations.  
 
Industry has also expressed concern that the independent monitoring agencies 
result in unnecessary complexity and a lack of transparency not conducive to 
maximizing environmental outcomes. There is some suggestion that monitoring 
agencies may actually confuse the lines of accountability and allow government 
                                                        
186 Security arrangements are a good example of an issue that perhaps should have been addressed 
through legislation. The author is aware that air quality issues and the effect of low level flights on 
wildlife have also been addressed through environmental agreements because of ambiguity as to 
whether they are under Federal or Territorial jurisdiction. 
187 Kennett, Supra Note 177 at 12. 
188 Affolder, Supra Note 10 at 174. 
189 Ibid at 168 
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regulators to avoid some of the responsibility under more conventional regulatory 
regimes.190 
 
Aboriginal participation in environmental monitoring and follow-up is also 
impacted by the environmental agreements. Aboriginal groups may be less likely to 
participate in the public process because they are able to assert their influence with 
Industry outside of the regulatory system and are able to address these issues 
through environmental agreements. This is particularly true when the public 
processes are seen by the Aboriginal groups to be culturally inappropriate. 
Administrative decision-making with its focus on evidence and top down decisions 
regarding development is very different from consensus decision making at the 
community level that is more familiar to many Dene people. 
 
4.6 How Environmental Agreements Interact with Impact Benefit 
Agreements 
It is unclear how the environmental agreements interplay with the impact benefit 
agreements. A number of Aboriginal groups have entered into two legally binding 
agreements with Industry, an environmental agreement and an impact benefit 
agreement, to address the environmental and social impacts of the same project on 
the community. This raises concerns regarding conflicting interests. The impact 
benefit agreements provide the Aboriginal groups with monetary payments and 
economic and business opportunities in exchange for their support for the 
development. The environmental agreements provide the Aboriginal groups with a 
monitoring and oversight role. Aboriginal groups may be reluctant to criticize the 
environmental performance of the company when they have an economic interest in 
supporting that company. The company could seek to rely on the support provisions 
of the impact benefit agreement to diminish Aboriginal opposition to their 
operations. This contradiction is less readily apparent because the commitments 
and obligations are contained in two separate instruments.  
                                                        
190 O’Faircheallaigh, Supra Note 146 at 18. These concerns were expressed to O’Faircheallaigh by BHPB 
in a private interview. 
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Bosselmann notes that one of the key goals of sustainable development is the 
integration of environmental conservation and social and economic development 
into one single policy area.191 It would be preferable to combine the environmental 
agreement and the impact benefit agreement into one integrated document. This 
would highlight the complex social, economic and environmental systems and allow 
for decision making which is more integrated and reflective of the arctic reality. 
There are practical disincentives to this approach including the culture of 
confidentiality around the impact benefit agreements192, issues of timing, and there 
may not be a complete overlap between parties to the environmental agreement 
and Parties to the impact benefit agreement. 
  
                                                        
191 Bosselmann, Supra Note 48 at 101. 
192 This is discussed in further detail in Chapter 5.1.3. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
5 IMPACT BENEFIT AGREEMENTS AND SOCIO-
ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS 
 
This Chapter examines the other two types of contractual agreements commonly 
used to regulate large projects in the Mackenzie Valley. Impact Benefit Agreements 
(IBAs) address the flow of benefits from industry directly to affected Aboriginal 
groups, and Socio-Economic Agreements (SEAs) address the flow of benefits from 
industry to all northerners and to the Government of the Northwest Territories.  
The objective of this chapter is not to provide an exhaustive study of these 
Agreements but to discuss how they interact with other parts of the regulatory 
system and to consider their potential to increase the overall resilience of the 
system. Because this paper is primarily concerned with environmental governance 
and not the redistribution of wealth (other than incidental to environmental 
governance), it is not my intention to provide more than a cursory overview of this 
topic.  
 
5.1 Impact Benefit Agreements (IBAS) 
IBAs are privately negotiated agreements between industry and Aboriginal 
communities and are seen as an accommodation for impacts on rights and a key 
element in the industry’s attempt to obtain a social license.   Generally, the 
Aboriginal group accepts some restrictions on their Aboriginal rights and title, and 
often agrees to provide access to their lands in exchange for economic benefits from 
the company and increased influence in matters relating to how the development 
proceeds. IBAs are private agreements and are generally not publicly available. IBAs 
are now a standard expectation for development projects in the Northwest 
Territories.  
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IBAs in the Mackenzie Valley usually involve cash payments to Aboriginal groups as 
compensation for impacts to the Aboriginal group arising from the Project. They 
also contain economic benefits such as preferential hiring, business opportunities, 
training, and monies for improvements to community infrastructure.193 IBAs can 
also be used to address environmental concerns and to create environmental 
monitoring schemes although larger projects in the Mackenzie Valley often have a 
separate Environmental Agreement. Increasingly, Aboriginal groups have been 
negotiating more lucrative IBAs that contain profit-sharing schemes or create equity 
interests.194 
 
 5.1.1 IBAs and the Modern Land Claim Process 
 
The requirement to negotiate an IBA often arises from Land Claim Agreements, 
particularly when the company requires access to Aboriginal lands for commercial 
purposes or in circumstances where the Aboriginal groups has title to the 
subsurface rights. 195  
 
There is no equivalent legal requirement for an IBA in the unsettled land claim 
areas, although a prudent developer would still seek Aboriginal support. On some 
occasions (example, transboundary projects), the unsettled groups have been able 
to leverage power of the settled claims to their advantage. When negotiations 
between Lutsel K’e and DeBeers became strained during the Gahcho Kue diamond 
                                                        
193 See S.A. Kennett (1999), “A Guide to Impact and Benefit Agreements. (Calgary: Canadian Institute of 
Resources Law for a description of some common terms included in IBAs.  
194 For Gahcho Kue diamond mine, the Lutsel k’e Dene First Nation negotiated flexible payments that 
allowed them to receive a portion of the company’s profits from the mine as opposed to the customary 
fixed payments. See Guy Quenneville, “No More Mr. Nice Guy” Uphere Business (10 January 2013) 
online at upherebusiness.ca/post/75061707886; Avalon minerals offered Lutsel K’e a 3.3 per cent equity 
interest in the Nechalacho rare earth minerals mine with a total of 10 per cent to all of the First Nations in 
the vicinity of the mine. See Eva Holland. “Staking the Claim” (2013) online at 
upherebusiness.ca/post/33848006611. 
195 Tlicho Agreement, Supra, Note 88. The Tlicho First Nation has title to 39000 square kilometers of lands 
including the subsurface rights. Any developer wanting to pursue development on those lands must obtain 
Tlicho consent. (Chapter 18.1.1). In addition, there are Tlicho lands where the Tlicho exercise their 
Aboriginal and Treaty rights but do not hold title in fee simple. Chapter 19.4.6 states that anyone requiring 
access to Tlicho lands for commercial purposes beyond a threshold level is required to obtain the 
agreement of the Tlicho government. If no agreement is reached, the parties may resort to the dispute 
resolution mechanisms (Chapter 6).  
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mine negotiations, Lutsel K’e First Nation and the Yellowknives Dene First Nations 
made arrangements to work cooperatively with the Tlicho First Nation as they knew 
that DeBeers was legally required to negotiate an agreement with the Tlicho First 
Nation under the Tlicho land claim agreement196. By leveraging the Tlicho First 
Nation’s expanded powers under the land claim agreement, they were able 
negotiate to the benefit the broader Dene communities. 
 
 The North Slave Metis have adopted a strategy of negotiating IBAs with industry in 
an attempt to further their legitimacy and desire for recognition by the Federal and 
Territorial Governments. Industry is often more willing to negotiate with the North 
Slave Metis as stakeholders and are less concerned with their status as rights-
holders. The North Slave Metis hope that this increased profile and access to 
financial resources through the IBAs will strengthen their overall political position 
and further their claims to lands and resources. 
5.1.2 Benefits of IBAs 
 
Aboriginal groups in the Mackenzie Valley support IBAs as they align more closely 
with the Aboriginal groups’ aspirations of self-government. As well, IBAs recognize 
Aboriginal groups as stewards of the land. IBAs allow for a more direct relationship 
between the Aboriginal groups and industry without the federal or territorial 
Government acting as intermediary. Fidler and Hitch correctly identify that this new 
relationship is more compatible with the stated Aboriginal goals of economic and 
political autonomy.197  
 
IBAs are also important in supporting economic development. There are some solid 
benefits to the company in entering into an IBA that include the opportunity to 
establish long-term and productive relationships with the adjacent Aboriginal 
community. This can be an important part of the company securing the social 
                                                        
196 Guy Quenneville, “No More Mr. Nice Guy” Uphere Business (10 January 2013) online at 
upherebusiness.ca/post/750617078864 at 4. 
197 Fidler and Hitch, Supra Note 11 at 56. 
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license to operate and avoiding local opposition to the project.198 IBAs allow the 
proponent to obtain employment and services from the community, which can be 
vital for companies operating in remote northern locations.199   The ability to access 
employment and services locally rather than flying them in from southern locations 
can be important to the commercial viability of the project.   
 
Through IBAS, developers are often able to access Aboriginal local knowledge on 
environmental, archeological and other matters significant to the projects’ 
development, construction and operation.200 Accessing this traditional knowledge 
base is critical in ensuring that the company is able to successfully navigate the 
regulatory hearings and promotes better environmental and social planning.  
 
IBAs should play an important part of “boom-bust” planning and allow Aboriginal 
communities to direct profits from the mine towards transition planning. 
O’Faircheallaigh notes that long-term planning is critical due to the finite nature of 
mineral resources and the instability of mineral markets. Without proper planning, 
mine closure can result in economic and social dislocation and seriously delay 
community development.201 
 
IBAs also address regional discrepancies by ensuring that negative impacts from 
development are not felt disproportionately at the local level while the benefits 
from the development are largely directed towards centralized governments.202 
IBAs give the impacted Aboriginal groups more power to address their issues 
directly with industry and to secure direct benefits from the project for 
development that occurs within their traditional territory. 
                                                        
198 Sandra Gogal, Richard Riegert and JoAnn Jamieson. “Aboriginal Impact and Benefit Agreements: 
Practical Considerations” (2005) 43 Alta. L. Rev. 129 at paragraph 42. 
199 Ibid at paragraph 42.  
200 Brad Gilmour and Bruce Mellett. “The Role of Impact and Benefit Agreements in the Resolution of 
Project Issues with First Nations” (2013) 51:2 Alta L. Rev. 385 at paragraph 70. 
201 Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, “Community Development Agreements in the Mining Industry: An 
Emerging Global Phenomenon” (2013) 44:2 Community Development 222 at 226. 
202 Ibid at 225-226. 
73 
 
 
 
 
5.1.3 Disadvantages of IBAs  
 
Since IBAs are privately negotiated contracts, there is no fixed content to an IBA and 
the parties are theoretically able to craft an agreement that is flexible and meets the 
specific needs of the project involved. In reality however, the tacit acceptance of 
standardized content of IBAs can result in exceedingly homogenous agreements that 
may reduce the effectiveness of the IBAs for Aboriginal groups.203 The potential 
creativity of the IBAs and their ability to facilitate an authentic relationship with 
Industry can be limited by the bureaucratic nature of the process. 
 
IBAs are privately negotiated contracts and they have the potential to be unfair and 
reflect an imbalance in the parties’ negotiating powers. As a result, some scholars 
argue that the federal and territorial governments should have a role in ensuring 
that Aboriginal people have the financial resources and access to sufficient 
information to leverage a fair deal.204 Some northern Aboriginal groups have also 
commented on the difficulties inherent in dealing with big companies without 
adequate government support.205   Still, other Aboriginal groups are very 
sophisticated in their approach to negotiating IBAs given their extensive experience 
in land claim negotiations.206    
 
Aboriginal groups who are left out of IBAs will often look to the MVRMA Boards to 
address socio-economic impacts as part of their regulatory process.   They will 
                                                        
203 This is discussed in Ken J. Caine and Naomi Krogman, “Powerful or Just Plain Power-full? A Power 
Analysis of Impact and Benefit Agreements in Canada’s North” (2010) 23:1 Organization & Environment 
76 at 81-89.  
204 Sosa and Keenan. “Impact Benefit Agreements between Aboriginal Communities and Mining 
Companies: Their Use in Canada” (Canadian Law Association, 2001) as discussed by Fidler and Hitch, 
Supra Note 11 at 58. 
205 Deninu Kue First Nation wants equal voice in mining projects”, CBC News (22 January 2015). Chief 
Louis Balsillie of the Deninu Kue First Nation noted that the FN was required to negotiate an IBA with De 
Beers for the Gahcho Kue mine with little help from the federal and territorial governments. Chief Balsillie 
stated that the FN had to fight for over a decade with De Beers to negotiate the IBA, and no other FN has 
been required to bring so much evidence in support of their rights on the land.  
206 See Quenneville, Supra Note 196 that highlights the sophisticated negotiating approach of the Lutsel 
K’e Dene First Nation. 
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sometimes argue that the Crown has inadequately consulted and accommodated 
them for impacts to their Aboriginal and Treaty rights as required under Section 35.   
However, these safeguards require a significant expenditure of resources for 
Aboriginal groups that is often not practical, especially for smaller projects.  
Sometimes the Government of the Northwest Territories will look to address the 
Aboriginal interests as part of their Socio-Economic Agreement. 
 
Timing may be a serious issue. IBA negotiations often occur relatively late in the 
development process leaving Aboriginal groups with the belief that they are not able 
to slow down the pace of development and that they are left with no options other 
than negotiating the maximum benefit flowing to the community from the inevitable 
development.207  
 
Much of the criticism of IBAS stems from two commonly negotiated terms of those 
agreements– confidentiality clauses and support clauses. 
 
 Confidentiality Clauses 
IBAs usually contain a confidentiality clause that restricts communication of IBAs to 
anyone outside of the negotiation process or the beneficiary process. Many scholars 
have been critical of this restriction as contrary to principles of openness and 
transparency and an obstacle to coherent environmental planning. Keeping 
observed in 1999 that benefit requirements vary from land claim to land claim in a 
way that is difficult to justify suggesting that development proponents benefit from 
this secret negotiation, given that Aboriginal groups have unequal capacity to 
participate.208  
 
Aboriginal groups in the Mackenzie Valley are increasingly successful in 
circumventing the confidentiality issue. This includes conducting joint negotiating 
                                                        
207 Caine and Krogman, Supra Note 203 at 85. 
208 Janet Keeping, (1999) “The legal and constitutional basis for benefits agreements: A summary” 
Northern Perspectives 24(4) as quoted by Caine and Krogman, Ibid at 86. 
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sessions with multiple Aboriginal groups present, and it is now common to 
negotiate a grandfathering clause that provides an opportunity for an Aboriginal 
group to renegotiate a term in the event that the company offers a more lucrative 
deal to another First Nation group.209 
 
Aboriginal groups have also shown a willingness to breach the confidentiality terms 
when deemed appropriate. This is demonstrated by the decision of the Norman 
Wells Land Corporation in 2006 to release the terms of the Imperial Oil Mackenzie 
Gas pipeline IBA to the media. This decision resulted in little reprisal from the 
company.210  
 
Gilmour and Millet argue that the confidentiality clauses actually work to industry’s 
disadvantage by preventing them from relying on the IBAs and the negotiations 
around the IBAs to satisfy the delegated procedural requirements of Section 35 
Crown consultation.211  This suggests that Aboriginal law is altering the balance of 
power in the negotiations of IBAs at least in so far as securing a more level playing 
field for Aboriginal people. 
 
Support Clauses 
Support clauses prevent an Aboriginal group from participating in activities that 
oppose the Project. This often includes a commitment to avoid litigation and will 
sometimes establish an alternative dispute resolution process as part of the IBA. It 
could also include a ban against opposing the project at the regulatory stage and 
against political opposition to the project such as protests. The support provisions 
                                                        
209 In the IBA negotiations with Avalon, the Tlicho, Yellowknives Dene and the Deninu Kue’ and Lutsel 
K’e held joint negotiating sessions, although each group ultimately entered into its own IBA. The 
grandfathering clause has also been negotiated by the Lutsel K’e FN See Quenneville, Supra Note 196 at 3. 
210 This incident is discussed in Caine and Krogman, Supra Note 203 at 77. 
211 Gilmour and Mellett, Supra Note 200 at paragraphs 53-58.  The Supreme Court of Canada has stated 
that proponents have no legal duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples.  However, prior to or concurrent 
with Crown consultation, the Crown may delegate certain procedural aspects to the Proponent. This would 
include such things as early engagement and information sharing.  Haida Nation v. British Columbia 
(Minister of Forests) 2004 SCC 73.  The Crown also relies on mitigations developed by Industry when 
assessing whether there has been adequate accommodation for impacts to Aboriginal and Treaty rights. 
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typically also prohibit an Aboriginal group from withholding key project input such 
as land access or the co-operation necessary to complete required studies.212 It may 
also contain an acknowledgement that the Crown’s consultation obligations have 
been fulfilled, although the legality of this type of provision would be questionable 
given the constitutional basis for the duty. 
 
Critics have argued that these support provisions limit the Aboriginal groups rights 
to object to new information that comes to light as the development proceeds or to 
socio-economic impacts that do not unfold as expected.213 This author believes that 
the Aboriginal groups are sufficiently enfranchised under the Land Claim 
Agreements, the co-management regime under the MVRMA, and Section 35 of the 
Canadian constitution that they are no longer willing to accept these limitations in 
the IBA. The bigger danger is that local leaders see the money stemming from the 
IBAs and adopt a short-term view of development that allows for an immediate 
influx of money into the community at the expense of more sustainable 
development practices.214 
 
5.1.4 How IBAs Interact with the MVRMA Environmental Assessment Process 
 
There is a complex relationship between the environmental assessment processes 
and IBAs. Caine and Krogman conclude that IBAs in the Mackenzie Valley are 
negotiated and ratified by Aboriginal groups and industries as part of an emerging 
accessory to land-claim mandated environmental impact assessment processes.215 
 
Every proponent that applies for a regulatory license in the Mackenzie Valley is 
screened by the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board and in cases 
                                                        
212 Ibid at paragraphs 25-31. 
213 Caine and Krogman, Supra Note 203 at 86. 
214 This is discussed in Peter D. Cameron and Ernesto Correa, “Towards the Contractual Management 
of Public-Participation Issues: A Review of Corporate Initiatives” in Donald N. Zillman, Alastair R. 
Lucas and George (Rock) Pring, eds. Human Rights in Resource Development (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) at 215. 
215 Caine and Krogman, Supra Note 203 at 78. 
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where the project has the potential for significant adverse impacts or be of public 
concern, may be referred to environmental assessment .216 Additionally, the 
Gwich’in, Sahtu and Tlicho First Nations have the authority to refer projects for 
environmental assessment if they are to be carried out in their settlement areas or, 
if they might have an environmental impact on that area.217 Environmental 
assessment in the Mackenzie Valley is a rigorous process and can be both time-
consuming and expensive for the proponent.  
 
The environmental assessment and regulatory process strongly encourages 
companies to resolve their issues with the Aboriginal groups, which may include the 
negotiation of IBAs. A company with a good relationship with the Aboriginal groups 
may be able to avoid an environmental assessment on a smaller development that 
might otherwise have been referred by the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board 
because of public concern or which could have been referred directly by the 
Aboriginal group if there were unresolved issues.  
 
Alternatively, if a project is referred to environmental assessment, and most major 
projects are because of the potential for significant adverse environmental impacts, 
the process is much more streamlined if the Aboriginal groups are co-operative with 
the proponent.   There is reduced delay at the hearing, and the proponents are 
better able to access the information that they need in order to prepare the 
documentation for the hearing, including the Developers Assessment Report and the 
traditional knowledge study.  
 
Finally, the IBAs give the proponents and the Aboriginal groups more control over 
the final outcome. Without an IBA, the parties may have the mitigations imposed on 
them as part of the regulatory process and often the regulatory body cannot award 
to an Aboriginal group the types of benefits that can be negotiated through the 
                                                        
216 MVRMA, Section 125. 
217 MVRMA, Section 126 (2)(b)(c). 
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IBA.218 In the Environmental Assessment process, mitigations are recommended by 
the Review Board, and once accepted by the Minister, become binding to the extent 
of the regulators authority. Regulatory terms can be cumbersome to alter and lack 
the flexibility of the IBA process which encourages more of an ongoing relationship 
between the signatories. 
 
Gilmour and Mellett argue that the regulatory process can, at times, be used by 
industry to pressure the Aboriginal group into entering into an IBA. A company that 
has done the necessary work to support a strong regulatory application and that can 
demonstrate adequate engagement of the affected First Nations is better able to 
negotiate a favorable deal and is in a better position to walk away from a bad deal 
because they can use the regulatory process as an alternative forum.219 Gogal, 
Riegert and Jamieson note that a proponent may also be required by the 
Environmental Assessment or regulatory authority to negotiate an IBA with affected 
Aboriginal communities as part of its recommended mitigations. 220 
 
5.2 Socio-Economic Agreements (SEAs) 
 
SEAs are agreements between the Government of the Northwest Territories and 
industry that address benefits for northerners arising from important resource 
projects. Both SEAs and IBAs are benefit agreements but the SEA is intended to 
address the broader public interest whereas IBAS are focused exclusively on 
Aboriginal beneficiaries and reflect their interests and priorities.  SEA negotiations 
are a public process and the final agreements are readily available to the public and 
to the regulators. There is a SEA in effect for each of the four diamond mines, and 
the Mackenzie Gas Project.  
 
                                                        
218 The Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board is not bound by the terms of an IBA and 
can recommend other mitigative measures, but they will show deference to an Agreement which has been 
negotiated by the Aboriginal groups and industry. 
219 Gilmour and Mellett, Supra Note 203 at Paragraph 66. 
220 Gogal, Riegert and Jamieson, Supra Note 199 at paragraphs 31-42. 
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5.2.1 Benefits of SEAs 
 
SEAs normally address benefit issues such as priority hiring for northerners, 
establishment of training and apprenticeship programs with targets for aboriginal 
and northern trainees, and other business opportunities for NWT businesses and 
sub-contractors.  
 
SEAs ensure that the Government of the Northwest Territories (GNWT) does not 
bear the entire financial burden of the increased demand on social and 
environmental services resulting from a project. 221 Issues addressed in SEAs 
include the increased cost to the NWT resulting from access to health services by 
non-northerners and the responsibility of industry to provide services to its 
employees, particularly its out-of-territory employees such as housing and routine 
medical services. 
 
SEAs also provide for the ongoing monitoring of socio-economic impacts and 
establishes processes to address the monitoring results. The SEA for Gahcho Kue 
diamond mine requires that: (1) the GNWT report annually on the socio-economic 
impacts of the mine and (2) that De Beers report annually on the commitments that 
it has made to address those socio-economic impacts. Both parties have committed 
to meet annually with representatives of Aboriginal groups and communities and to 
respond within 90 days to concerns raised during that engagement process. Beyond 
the requirement of a formal response, there is no requirement to implement any of 
the recommendations made at these community meetings.222 This is an important 
first step in establishing feedback loops on socio-economic impacts which have 
largely been lacking in the environmental assessment process. It also acknowledges 
that the management of socio-economic impacts is a shared government, industry 
and community responsibility. The lack of an accountability framework beyond the 
                                                        
221 Galbraith, Bradshaw and Rutherford, Supra Note 9 at 37. 
 
222 Gahcho Kue Project Socio Economic Agreement signed June 28, 2013 and available online at 
www.iti.gov.nt.ca/sites/default/files/debeers_agreement_0.pdf at 24-28. 
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requirement to respond means that SEAs are unable to deliver substantive 
outcomes in decision-making.  
 
5.2.2 Disadvantages of SEAs 
 
A primary issue with SEAs is that they have been political and aspirational in nature. 
SEAs have tended to reiterate existing legal obligations, such as obligations to 
respect human rights or a commitment to employment equity. While this may be 
useful in further encouraging industry compliance with its existing legal obligations, 
it does not create any further legal entitlement. 223  
 
SEAs also tend to contain industry commitments that are vague, or so broad and 
general that it would be difficult for the GNWT to demonstrate a lack of industry 
compliance. Many SEAs contain targets for the companies as opposed to firm 
commitments. Many fail to include penalties when industry does not comply with 
the provisions. 
 
Another problem with the SEAS is that the public beneficiaries of the Agreement are 
often not parties to it and therefore do not have legal standing to enforce their rights 
under the agreement. They must rely on the GNWT to take their case forward, a 
decision that is subject to political pressures.224 The SEAs have been inconsistent on 
whether Aboriginal groups are included under the SEA.   Two of the SEAs 
contemplate that Aboriginal groups may become parties to the Agreement (Diavik 
and Snap Lake Agreements.). Other Agreements do not make provision for 
Aboriginal organizations to become parties to the Agreements. (Ekati, Mackenzie 
Gas Project, and Gahcho Kue Agreements).  
                                                        
223 Ciaran, O’Faircheallaigh, “Independent Review of the Mackenzie Gas Project Socio-Economic 
Agreement” prepared for Alternatives North as part of its submissions to the Joint Review Panel at 
the environmental impact review hearings, June 2007 and available online at 
www.alternativesnorth.ca at 2. 
224Nigel Banks, “ A Policy Review of the Mackenzie Gas Project Socio-Economic Agreement” prepared 
for Alternatives North as part its submissions to the Joint Review Panel at the environmental impact review 
hearings of the Mackenzie Gas Project, August, 2007 and available online at www.alternativesnorth.ca at 6. 
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5.2.3 How SEAs Interact with IBAs  
 
SEAs may prevent Aboriginal peoples from addressing socio-economic issues that 
genuinely concern them in their IBAS because those issues are seen as a territorial 
or federal government responsibility. This may be beneficial to industry since it is 
able to avoid dealing with Aboriginal concerns on a community level where the 
impacts are actually felt in favour of a more regional approach.  
 
Caine and Krogman demonstrate through their research that Aboriginal people are 
immensely concerned about social issues including: (1) language retention, (2) use 
of traditional knowledge and (3) maintaining connections to the land.  Yet these 
culturally compatible notions of social development are subverted in the IBAs to key 
capitalist indicators of benefits, employment, training and business opportunities. 
Craine and Krogman argue that the IBAs could do much more to support aboriginal 
culture, but that industry has been reluctant to address social and cultural impacts 
of development largely because this is seen as a federal and territorial government 
responsibility. They note that the fact that these issues are addressed in SEAs gives 
legitimacy to this position.225  
 
Steven Nitah, negotiator for the Lutsul K’e Band discussed a similar issue in a recent 
interview. The community of Lutsul K’e recognized that students were not 
graduating with the equivalent of a grade ten education, which was the minimum 
that they required in order to quality for entry-level apprenticeship programs with 
De Beers. The community wanted De Beers to provide the financial resources to 
supplement an additional teacher’s wage and increase the educational capacity in 
the community. However, they were informed that the policies of De Beers and the 
GNWT would not allow for such an arrangement.226 The GNWT was reluctant to 
relinquish its authority over education, which is a core territorial government 
function. However, the Band is in the unenviable position of being dissatisfied with 
                                                        
225 Caine and Krogman, Supra Note 203 at page 87.  
226 Quenneville, Supra Note 196. 
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the educational system, and being denied the ability to directly address this issue 
through their IBA. This is augmented by a sense of urgency as they attempt to 
capitalize on an opportunity that is finite in nature. Arguably, the Band does have a 
right to address education as part of a broader right of self-government but that 
does not assist it in the present dilemma. 
 
5.2.4 How SEAs Interact with MVRMA Environmental Assessment Process 
 
The Government of the Northwest Territories commonly asks Mackenzie Valley 
Environmental Impact Review Board (MVEIRB) to recommend a SEA as part of the 
environmental impact assessment so that economic commitments made by the 
company at the hearing are fulfilled.227 The SEA can augment the environmental 
assessment process by creating contractual obligations that could not otherwise be 
addressed in regulatory instruments and which do not fit easily with the EA process. 
These obligations include socio-economic monitoring and follow-up and adaptive 
management of the social system. The SEA also allows the MVEIRB to address the 
benefits of development, which it is otherwise not well-equipped to do.228  
 
For example, in the Gahcho Kue environmental impact review, the MVEIRB found as 
follows: 
“Based on the evidence and information provided, it is the opinion of the panel that 
the effects are not likely to be significant provided the developer implements its 
commitments including the negotiation and implementation of a socio-economic 
agreement with the GNWT.”229  
 
                                                        
227 Northern Developers Ministers Forum, Benefit Agreements in Canada’s North (August 2013) 
available online at http://books.scholarsportal.info/viewdoc.html?id+641771 at 73-75. 
The Diavik SEA and the Snap Lake SEA were both negotiated at least in part to satisfy the Environmental 
Assessment Review Panel’s recommendations. This is discussed by Banks, Supra Note 224 at 5.  
228 Lindsay Galbraith, Understanding the Need for Supraregulatory Agreements in Environmental 
Assessment: An Evaluation from Northwest Territories Canada (Masters Thesis, Simon Fraser University, 
Department of Geography, 2005) [unpublished] at 84-85. Galbraith argues that SEAS stem from the 
perceived deficiencies of an EA process in providing for economic benefits. 
229 Gahcho Kue Report, Supra Note 162 at 142. 
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This provides an opening where the GNWT may be able to negotiate additional 
benefits that are not otherwise available through the environmental assessment 
process.  
 
SEAs negotiated in tandem with the environmental assessment hearing can be very 
effective. However, SEAs are sometimes completed in advance of the completion of 
the EA230. SEAs completed in advance of the MVEIRB report can undermine the 
environmental assessment process by providing a series of mitigation measures 
which have been identified outside of the environmental assessment process and 
which are implemented by contract before the MVEIRB has had the opportunity to 
provide its recommendations. This does not prevent MVEIRB from identifying 
additional mitigations but it creates bureaucratic duplication and may require either 
amendment of the SEA or creation of additional enforcement mechanisms to 
implement Board recommendations thus contributing another layer of bureaucracy 
to an already complex regulatory system. MVEIRB, if presented with a SEA in 
advance of their recommendations may be more likely to accept the negotiated 
contract than to provide its preferred option in order to avoid duplication and 
regulatory confusion.  
 
5.2.5 How SEAS Interact with the Division of Powers Between the Federal and Territorial 
Government  
 
One of the key issues for the GNWT in negotiating the SEAs was its own relative lack 
of power within the overall regulatory process. The federal government set the 
terms for resource development on federal Crown lands and received the royalties 
from the use of these lands whereas the social and economic burden fell 
disproportionately to the GNWT. Galbraith argues that the SEAs were designed to 
mend this economic disparity between the federal and territorial governments by 
                                                        
230 For example, the SEA for the MGP was completed January 19, 2007, almost a year before the 
completion of the hearings and two years in advance of the release of the Joint Review Panel’s report, 
released December 2009. 
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trying to secure greater economic benefits for the GNWT directly from the 
developer.231  
 
With the transfer of federal Crown lands to the GNWT as part of the devolution 
process, the GNWT has more regulatory tools at their disposal, including the ability 
to set the terms of land leases on Crown lands. It remains to be seen whether the 
GNWT will continue its reliance on SEAs or will prefer to streamline the process by 
addressing socio-economic issues in other regulatory instruments. 
  
                                                        
231 Galbraith, Supra Note 228 at 84-85. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
6 ANALYSIS  
 
This Chapter argues that the key to a truly adaptive regulatory system is principled 
flexibility. It argues that many of the regime characteristics supportive of principled 
flexibility are present in the Mackenzie Valley, largely because the northern 
regulatory regime is integrally linked to the Aboriginal land claim process and 
receives much of its strength and resilience from its connections with Aboriginal 
rightsholders. 
 
6.1 The Regulatory System in the Mackenzie Valley is operating as a 
complex and interactive system 
This is one of the main insights of this paper. Resilience theory distinguishes 
between complicated systems and complex systems. Complicated systems are 
notable because the elements of that system maintain an element of independence 
from each other and the system can be managed by its individual components. 
Complex systems in contrast are more dynamic, exhibit complex collective 
behaviours and respond more readily to their internal and external environments.  
 
The arctic environment operates as a complex and interactive system. The 
environmental impacts resulting from climate change are far-reaching where the 
environment continues to evolve and adapt. This evolution is a subject for scientific 
analysis and much has been written on the subject. 
 
This paper provides some insight into how the regulatory system in the Mackenzie 
Valley operates as a complex whole. It highlights the ways that the impact benefit 
agreements, environmental agreements, and socio-economic agreements are not 
discrete contractual instruments but interact with each other and with the MVRMA 
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regulatory regime in order to regulate the project. This sometimes results in good 
governance in support of adaptive management, but in other instances it is ill suited 
for the task.  
 
For example, industry may enter into an Impact Benefit Agreement or an 
Environmental Agreement in advance of an environmental assessment hearing in 
order to garner Aboriginal support for the Project and increase the likelihood of 
success at the hearing and to avoid having the regulatory Board impose measures to 
address impacts identified by the Aboriginal group at the hearing which are 
unpalatable to industry. This can be advantageous because it allows industry and 
the Aboriginal groups to be creative and find responsive solutions for that 
community. At other times, it can be maladaptive if it means that evidence that 
should before the MVRMA Board in order to allow them to fully assess the impacts of 
the project and the adequacy of the environmental and social mitigations is not 
brought forward. Agreements made in the Impact Benefit Agreement may support 
economic development at the expense of environmental protection and may be 
entered into by the Aboriginal groups before the full impacts of the project are 
understood. Additionally, there is also a negative democratic impact as public 
hearing processes are subverted to private negotiations.  
 
Aboriginal rights and their legal protections is also a key element in this complex 
regulatory environment. Section 35 is a driver for the federal and territorial 
governments. They encourage the use of contractual instruments in order to meet 
their legal obligation to ensure accommodation of impacts to Aboriginal and Treaty 
rights. Section 35 is a driver for industry to enter into impact benefit agreements 
and environmental agreements. They want to avoid delays if Aboriginal and Treaty 
rights are not adequately accommodated by the federal and territorial governments 
and avoid unnecessary conflict with the Aboriginal groups. The Aboriginal groups 
use this system to further their environmental and economic interests. Their ability 
to launch court challenges if their rights are not accommodated is a powerful part of 
the overall regulatory regime.  
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Understanding that the contractual instruments are part of the overall complex 
regulatory system allows all interested parties including Aboriginal groups to think 
more strategically about how to use them. Understanding that the regulatory regime 
is a complex system highlights the need for a principled approach that can apply 
across the multiplicity of instruments that now make up the regulatory regime. This 
is necessary to avoid a maladaptive system where a multiplicity of immediate 
interests is reflected in a jumble of regulatory instruments that ultimately 
undermine the broader environmental goals.  
 
6.2 The MVRMA regulatory regime does not necessarily promote 
adaptive management 
 
The MVRMA was found by the auditors in the 2015 Northwest Territories 
Environmental Audit to be generally effective in protecting the environment and it 
remains an example of Canadian environmental best practices.232 However, the 
MVRMA, like most environmental legislation in Canada, ultimately adopts a 
relatively static view of the environment and relies on regulatory tools which are 
not well-suited for adaptive management particularly in a changing environment 
which resists the concept of a single state of environmental optimality. 
Characteristics of the MVRMA system which are focused on engineering resilience 
and maladapted to adapted management include a heavy focus on pre-construction 
environmental assessment, risk management, and cost-benefit analysis.  
 
Some of the sections of the MVRMA which could potentially have made it more 
progressive and fostered adaptive management were never fully implemented like 
the Cumulative Impacts Monitoring Program, and some of the land use planning 
                                                        
232GNWT, 2015 Northwest Territories Environment Audit, (Yellowknife: ENR, March 2016).  
available online at www.enr.gov.nt.ca/sites/default/files/2015-environmental-audit at ES1-2. 
Section 148 of the MVRMA requires an independent environmental audit every five years and sets 
out the requirements for that audit. 
88 
 
 
 
initiatives including the Protected Areas Strategy. There has been progress on land 
use planning identified in the 2015 Environmental audit but it continued to be 
identified by the auditors as a foundational challenge.233 The MVRMA alone cannot 
adequately address adaptive management issues because of structural constraints 
associated with being an institution of public government bound by the rules of 
administrative fairness. It is important to protect the rights of the Parties in a public 
process. However, there is a heavily reliance on advance decision-making 
predicated on reliable baseline data. Decision-makers are limited in their exercise of 
discretion by the mandates established by legislation, and the process for altering a 
decision is administratively onerous and often relies on the Proponent to make the 
application. These can be unfortunate limitations in a non-stationary environment. 
The regulatory system relies on the contractual agreements to increase the overall 
adaptability of the system and address some of the key limitations  
 
 
6.3 One of the Key Tools required for the Transition to an Adaptive 
Management Regime is “Principled Flexibility” 
 
Central to the functioning of an adaptive management regime is the need for 
“principled flexibility”. 
 
This concept is developed in the literature by the resilience theorists Kundis Craig 
and Harm Benson. For them, ‘principled flexibility’ involves a focus on stronger, 
legally enforceable and institutionally supported goals within the regulatory system, 
but more flexibility and discretion is given to the decision-maker on how to achieve 
those goals.234 
 
Arnold and Gunderson similarly argue that an adaptive legal system would need to 
provide the right mix of adaptive flexibility and principled accountability of the 
                                                        
233 Ibid. at ES-1. 
234 Kundis Craig and Harm Benson, Supra Note 17 at 877. 
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decision-makers. They suggest that discretionary decision-making is a necessary 
element of adaptive environmental management and that concerns regarding the 
arbitrary nature of discretion can be addressed through the development of 
appropriate and relevant standards to govern the exercise of discretion and to 
which decision-makers can be held accountable.235  
 
Those theorists position principled flexibility solely within the statutory framework. 
It is a legislated solution to a regulatory problem. I argue that principled flexibility 
must extend beyond government decision-making to other 
stakeholders/rightsholders because those groups play a key regulatory role. It 
should apply to diverse regulatory instruments like environmental agreements, 
impact benefit agreements, and socio-economic agreements. Principled flexibility 
would need to be guided by shared values or a shared culture of environmental 
management as there is often no legislative authority for the contractual 
agreements.  
 
This insight draws heavily from resilience theory but also from new governance 
theory which advocates a more collaborative model of decision-making with an 
increased focus on process, consensus, and shared responsibilities among many 
actors aimed at achieving policy objectives. Many of the foundational principles also 
come from Aboriginal law such as the reconciliation of Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal world views on environmental stewardship and the recognition of 
Aboriginal people as rights holders with legal rights both procedural and 
substantive on issues involving environmental stewardship on their traditional 
lands. 
 
The key missing element for the effective functioning of the regulatory system in the 
Mackenzie Valley is a shared culture of adaptive management and a social and 
environmental coordinating framework that would exist across the multiplicity of 
                                                        
235 Arnold and Gunderson, Supra Note 53 at 29. 
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instruments and ensure that these instruments work together in order to promote 
sound environmental management.  
 
This shared vision is especially important because contractual agreements are 
entered into by parties pursuing special interests that are sometimes only 
peripherally related to environmental protection. Impact Benefit Agreements are 
primarily aimed at securing economic benefits for Aboriginal peoples. As such, there 
is significant potential for these types of instruments to work at cross-purposes to 
environmental protection if their integration into the overall regulatory regime is 
not adequately understood and managed.  
 
In the remainder of this paper, I argue that the Mackenzie Valley region of the NWT 
is ideally suited to develop this principled flexibility. Many of the characteristics of 
the Mackenzie Valley regulatory system, often developed because of the 
involvement of Aboriginal rightsholders, are supportive of adaptive management 
and the development of a shared environmental coordinating framework. 
 
6.3.1 The MVRMA regime was designed as an integrated management regime 
 
 
The MVRMA is forward thinking legislation because of its key goals of integration, 
co-ordination and co-management. The MVRMA establishes an integrated 
management regime that takes a more holistic view of the environment than 
elsewhere in Canada. It includes a focus not only on the environment but also on the 
social and cultural effects of developments. This reflects the Aboriginal peoples 
preference for a more integrated approach to environmental management that they 
successfully negotiated into their Land Claim Agreements. This goal will be better 
realized when some key sections of the legislation including the sections on land use 
planning and cumulative impacts monitoring and follow-up are more fully 
implemented.  
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There is potential to enhance this integrated approach to environmental 
management through the use of the contractual agreements. However, currently the 
contractual instruments do not always support this approach. The separation of 
impact benefits and environmental impacts into separate contractual agreements is 
not supportive of an environmental vision that takes an integrated approach to 
social and environmental impacts and obscures their complex interactions. 
 
6.3.2 The MVRMA regime implements a government commitment to co-management 
of the Mackenzie Valley with the Aboriginal Peoples 
 
The MVRMA was designed to implement the federal government’s commitment to 
co-management with the Aboriginal people in the Mackenzie Valley. There are 
progressive features aimed at increasing Aboriginal participation. The legislation 
does a good job in encouraging Aboriginal participation at regulatory hearings and 
attempts to incorporate Aboriginal traditional knowledge into decision-making on 
par with Western science. 
 
The MVRMA is also incorporates Aboriginal persons into decision-making. There are 
provisions requiring that membership of the MVRMA Boards be comprised of 
Aboriginal peoples. Ultimate decision-making on most issues continues to rest with 
the federal and territorial governments. However, those Governments are not able 
to vary an MVEIRB decision without consulting with the Board members, and are 
not able to reject an environmental assessment recommendation by the Board 
without ordering an environmental impact review. The Boards have significant 
power under this regime and Aboriginal people have a very real presence on those 
Boards. As noted elsewhere, the federal and territorial governments rarely override 
a Board decision. 
 
The MVRMA regime is process oriented and modeled on the old Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act. It allows Aboriginal peoples greater participatory 
rights within the Western model of environmental regulation, and greater power to 
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influence environmental decisions. It does not re-define the regulatory process to be 
more reflective of Aboriginal values or question whether there is a better model for 
addressing complex northern issues. 
 
Aboriginal groups have used environmental agreements and impact benefit 
agreements to redefine their relationship with developers. They have successfully 
negotiated increased input and influence into decision-making through these 
contractual agreements. This augments their power under the legislation and allows 
them input into decision throughout the life of the project. 
 
6.3.3 The MVRMA Boards Exert a Strong Regulatory Presence 
 
This paper has demonstrated that the MVRMA Boards are fundamentally important 
in supporting the northern regulatory regime. Braithwaite and Ayers were correct 
in advocating for a strong regulator whose threat of sanctions compels parties to 
reach negotiated settlements.236 The existence of a strong regulator ensures that 
cooperation by developers is not voluntary although parties are encouraged to think 
creatively about how the desired outcomes might be achieved.  
 
The MVRMA Boards have considerable influence in the Mackenzie Valley. The 
MVRMA operationalizes the co-management regime agreed to in the land-claim 
agreements and enjoys a very high level of legitimacy with the northern Aboriginal 
groups and the federal and territorial governments. They are rarely the final 
decision-maker but the federal and territorial governments rarely override Board 
decisions.  
 
 Parties to the contractual instruments know that these Boards will accord them 
some flexibility to address the environmental and social impacts but in the event 
that they are not successful in resolving these issues, the Board will either deal with 
it themselves and impose the solution through mitigative measures attached to 
                                                        
236 Ayers and Braithwaite, Supra Note 22. 
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licenses or sometimes require an acceptable contractual solution as a prerequisite 
for receiving regulatory approval.  
 
It is naive to expect that the contractual instruments will be completely voluntary. 
The presence of the Boards as a substitute regulator if negotiations are unsuccessful 
is an important component in allowing environmental agreements, IBAs, SEAs and to 
operate effectively. The MVEIRB has also been a key facilitator in the dialogue 
among the various stakeholders/rightsholders because of the legitimacy that it has 
with all parties. I envision that the MVRMA boards would continue to have an 
important role in reinforcing the principles of a shared environmental vision 
developed as part of principled flexibility. 
 
6.3.4 Section 35 of the Constitution Act enhances the authority of the MVRMA Boards 
and resists attempts to increase administrative efficiency at the expense of 
adaptive management 
 
 
Section 35 plays a significant role in protecting the uniqueness of the northern 
regime.   One of the reasons that the federal and territorial governments support the 
current regime is because they want to rely on the board process to satisfy the 
Crown’s legal duty to consult with Aboriginal people under Section 35.  Companies 
enter into contracts because they want to avoid delays resulting from litigation 
resulting from the Crown’s failure to fulfil their Section 35 obligations. 
 
Law is not always supportive of adaptive management.  Ruhl argues convincingly 
that the rule of law exists to establish relatively stable contexts within which other 
social systems can operate over time.237 This would include a stable environment 
within which industry can safely operate to maximize revenue. This results in legal 
pressure to move away from more diverse models of decision and to look for more 
transparency, certainty and finality in decision–making.   These are important 
                                                        
237 Ruhl, Supra Note 63 at 2. 
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principles of administrative law but they are not always compatible with adaptive 
management or fostering ecological resilience.  
 
In the Mackenzie Valley, the application of Section 35 has been relatively successful 
in maintaining the co-management structure established in the legislation and 
protecting it from subsequent legislative or policy efforts to alter the MVRMA 
structure to foster greater administrative efficiency.  This is partly because of the 
link between the land claim agreements and the co-management structure in the 
MVRMA and the constitutional protections that follow from that association.238   The 
MVRMA Boards are not the only forum that the Aboriginal groups have to advance 
their Aboriginal and Treaty rights which often includes their environmental rights.  
There would likely be more dissatisfaction with the bureaucratic nature of the 
MVRMA if the Aboriginal groups did not have access to the court system as an 
alternate way to advance their rights through the application of Section 35. 
 
The Canadian constitution does not provide stand-alone protection for 
environmental rights.   This means that Aboriginal groups have access to legal 
avenues that are not available to non-Aboriginal people in order to pursue their 
environmental interests.  This has forced the environmental groups into a 
meaningful dialogue with Aboriginal groups in order to bring forward the 
environmental agenda.   One of the reasons that Ecology North was successful in 
pushing the boundaries and gaining inclusion in the Giant Mine Environmental 
Agreement was likely the productive working relationship that it had developed 
with the Yellowknives Dene. 
 
6.3.5 There is a strong precedent in the Mackenzie Valley for the use of contractual 
instruments as part of the overall regulatory regime 
 
Aboriginal groups have been successful in securing substantial economic and social 
benefits through contractual agreements. Through environmental agreements, they 
                                                        
238 Tlicho Government v. The Attorney General of Canada et al., Supra Note 76 discussed at 2.2.1. 
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are able to hold government and industry accountable for environmental 
stewardship and promote more collaborative environmental management . Other 
stakeholders including environmental groups and the territorial and federal 
governments have benefited from these types of agreements. 
 
Contractual agreements can be less bureaucratic and potentially provide valuable 
adaptability enhancements to the overall regulatory system. Attributes of 
contractual agreements that might allow them to enhance the adaptive management 
regime include: (1) they are less constrained by the statutory framework and 
administrative structure and therefore may promote flexibility and creativity in 
problem-solving; (2) contractual arrangements can foster an ongoing relationship 
between stakeholders/rightsholders which allows for greater collaboration over 
time; (3) contractual arrangements are arguably more easily amended to meet 
changing conditions; and (4) the proliferation of instruments and potential for 
greater and more varied stakeholder involvement can allow for more localized 
decisions catering to the environmental and social needs of a particular region. We 
have seen all of these attributes at play at various times in the Mackenzie Valley. 
 
There are undoubtedly challenges with contractual agreements that are outlined 
earlier in this paper. However, there is also the potential to create a stronger 
regulatory system. The key is principled flexibility so that parties can use 
contractual agreements to construct a system with more of an underlying rationality 
for how the parts fit together. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
The author has argued in this paper that the regulatory regime in the Mackenzie 
Valley should be characterized by a new approach to adaptive management that 
allows for and encourages a multiplicity of regulatory instruments including private 
contractual instruments. The paper has also demonstrated that the Mackenzie 
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Valley regime is already well suited to developing this type of a modern 
environmental regime because of the characteristics outlined in the previous 
paragraphs. However, in order for this multiplicity of instruments to succeed as a 
coherent environmental governance structure and not result in an incoherent legal 
and policy jumble, there must be principled flexibility.  
 
This principled flexibility requires a shared environmental vision or culture which 
exists across stakeholders and which ensures that there is an underlying rationality 
to the multiplicity of instruments so that they are not working at cross-purposes. 
The author believes that environmental governance in the Mackenzie Valley could 
be greatly strengthened if more attention was given to the development of an 
environmental vision separate from the process-oriented goals of integration, co-
ordination and co-management. 
 
What would this environmental coordinating framework look like? Sustainability is 
the key western tool for encouraging environmental and social goal-based decision 
making, and this author is convinced that sustainability principles will be prominent 
in constructing this environmental vision for the Mackenzie Valley. Resilience is also 
a key principle given the instability of the arctic ecosystems and the importance of 
meeting the challenges of climate change in a practical way.  
 
Bosselmann argues that environmental ethics can broadly be divided into two main 
schools of thought. Anthropocentric theorists rely upon traditional Western values 
based on human welfare or human rights. The environment is an instrument of 
value in achieving those other goals. The focus therefore is on seeking compromise 
and trade-offs in order to maximize human outcomes. Non-anthropocentric 
theorists argue that the non-human environment has an intrinsic value irrespective 
of human needs. Bosselmann argues that the latter approach allows for a stronger 
approach to sustainable development because it allows economic and social 
development within the parameters of ecology rather than always looking for 
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compromises in order to maximize outcomes.239 Neither of these perspectives 
reflect traditional Dene world views which does not conceive of a separation 
between the human world and the non-human world. 
 
The Dene are the original residents of the Mackenzie Valley and their environmental 
vision will be fundamentally important in developing the principles of 
environmental management in the North. The Dene are often more receptive to the 
idea of multiple ways of knowing than their non-Aboriginal colleagues. Grand Chief 
Jimmy Bruneau famously commented that the Tlicho people needed to be educated 
in both the Dene ways and the ways of the Whites so that they can be “strong like 
two people.”240 
 
Dene environmental goals will likely involve a more traditional understanding of the 
place of both human and other-than-human inhabitants within nature and within 
the complex web of relationships that make up the Dene lands. The Tlicho Dene 
refers to the lands on which they reside as the “de” which has a cultural context very 
different from Western concepts of land. Philip Zoe, a member of the Tlicho Dene 
described the de in the following terms:  
“ There are no empty spaces. All spaces are used by something, fox, fish, trees, 
humans, winds, northern lights. It might look empty, but all of the De is used”. 241  
 
For the Tlicho Dene, maintaining the total web of relationships within the de is vital 
to both the survival of the de and the continual rebirth of all that has spirit.242 
 
This is potentially transformative because Western tradition has lost most of its 
understanding of the interconnection between humans and the lands and it may not 
be possible to regulate a complex ecosystem without regaining that consciousness. 
                                                        
239 Bosselmann, Supra Note 48 at 105. 
240 This famous quote is reproduced by Allice Legat in “Walking the Land, Feeding the Fire: Knowledge 
and Stewardship Among the Tlicho Dene” 2012 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press) at 62. Legat 
provides a more detailed analysis of the reasons why the Tlicho Dene are receptive to “knowing two 
ways” at 30-32. 
241 Ibid. at 96. 
242 Ibid at 31. 
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From a practical point of view, it is important to incorporate Dene values. Many of 
the contractual agreements are entered into between industry and the Dene and it is 
simply not possible to have a principled approach to environmental governance 
across these instruments without an environmental vision that resonates with the 
Dene. If you accept that the regulatory regime in the Mackenzie Valley is broader 
than just the legislative scheme, then the environmental coordinating framework 
needs to be greater than merely sustainability.   It is beyond the scope of this paper 
to discuss just what an environmental coordinating framework for the north would 
look like.   However, I would like to offer some comments on the possible path 
forward. 
 
Julia Black provides some interesting insights on the role of  regulatory conversation 
in the overall regulatory process.   She defines regulatory conversations as “the 
communications that occur between regulators, regulated, and others involved in 
the regulatory process concerning the operation of the regulatory system.” 243  Black 
argues that regulation is a communicative process.  Discourse forms the basis of 
regulation in the following ways:  (1) it builds understanding and definitions of both 
problems and acceptable and appropriate solutions; (2) it builds operational 
categories; and (3) it produces the identities of and relationship between actors in 
the process.     This communicative process is functional in that it is designed to 
meet certain ends, and coordinating in that it produces shared meaning as to 
regulatory norms and social practices which are then translated into action.244 
 
Black also develops the concept of interpretive communities.  Interpretive 
communities in the regulatory context are characterized by a shared understanding 
and commitment to the goals of the regulatory system and a shared understanding 
of the way that conflicts, inconsistencies and trade-offs may be addressed.  Black 
argues that the normative commitment to the goals and values of the regulatory 
                                                        
243 Julia Black, “Regulator Conversations” in Sol Picciotto & David Campbell, eds, New Directions in 
Regulatory Theory (Bristol, UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2002) 163 at 170. 
244 Ibid at 164-165 
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process fostered by interpretive communities may be essential for regulatory 
effectiveness.245  This is similar to the concept of principled flexibility as developed 
in this paper. 
 
Black  emphasizes the role of “storylines” in regulatory discourse.   Storylines 
simplify and distil complex scientific issues such as climate change into more 
accessible narratives.  This allows a wide variety of disciplines to talk to each other 
and contribute knowledge on the same subject matter.  Overtime, storylines may 
become ritualized and are used to rationalize a particular approach to what seems 
like a coherent problem.  Storylines create coalitions among stakeholders, but also 
create shared knowledge and influence action.246 
 
What does this mean for regulation in the Mackenzie Valley?   Dialogue is 
fundamentally important because it creates opportunities for regulatory 
conversations and for consensus-building among the stakeholders.   This paper has 
demonstrated that the northern regulatory system is a complex system with 
important elements of that system operating outside of but interacting with the 
legislative framework.   We need to rationalize the various elements of the system so 
that they work together in support of sound environmental management principles.  
This requires interpretive communities that include Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
people and which are committed to a shared vision so that they can institute a 
cooperative framework across a multiplicity of instruments.  This is what I refer to 
as principled flexibility.  Otherwise, you run the risk that the instruments will work 
at cross-purposes or just constitute a jumble of instruments that don’t lead us 
towards any particular environmental goal. 
 
We also need to be cognizant of our storylines and ensure that those storylines 
allow space for Dene world views to be part of the collective shared knowledge and 
that they move us towards actions which are acceptable to the Dene people.   It is 
                                                        
245 Ibid at 176 
246 Ibid at 188. 
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very important that we do not create different storylines, an Aborginal and a Non-
Aboriginal storyline, that are irreconcilable and unable to talk to each other 
 
These environmental narratives need not be identical but they need to work 
together in the interest of strong environmental management.   Practically, this may 
not be such a daunting task.   The Dene understand the importance of fighting 
climate change and the science behind it.   Non-Aboriginal people recognize that the 
current strategy for fighting climate change has not been effective.   There has been 
some promising work by Albert Marshall from the Mi’kmaq Nation on “Two Eyed 
Seeing” and strategies for incorporating both Indigenous knowledge and traditional 
Western knowledge into decision-making processes.  Marshall argues that a person 
with knowledge of two systems can uniquely combine the two knowledges and that 
this new creative thinking is essential in addressing an environmental crisis.247   
“Two eyed seeing” requires a fundamental acceptance that knowledge is culturally 
created – and that other cultures can have equally valid systems of knowledge.   If 
we can make that leap, then reconciliation of the two knowledge systems may not be 
that difficult.   One of the key differences will be in how we value the land and how 
we reconcile the use of valued ecosystem components as a key scientific tool while 
promoting an understanding of the land as its own complex and spiritual system. 248   
 
It is important to support Dene project initiatives which focus on re-connecting 
Dene people to their traditional knowledge and to help preserve Indigenous culture 
and stewardship to the land.   For example, the Indigenous guardians programs in 
                                                        
247 A full discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.   For more information see Cheryl Bartlett, 
Albert Marshall and Murdena Marshall, “Two-Eyed Seeing and other lessons learned within a co-
learning journey of bringing together Indigenous and mainstream knowledges and ways of knowing” 
(2012) 2(4) Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences DOI:10.1007/s13412-012-0086-8. 
248 Another example worth examining would be the experience of Greenpeace and the Inuit 
communities.  Greenpeace was instrumental in organizing a boycott of seal products in the 1976 with 
devastating economic and cultural results for Inuit economies.  The Inuit felt strongly that the 
boycott was unfair and failed to respect their traditional way of life and misconstrued their 
relationship with the environment.   Greenpeace has been working hard to repair this relationship 
including issuance of an apology and publication of a Greenpeace Canada policy of Indigenous rights.  
There are lessons to be learned from this experience on the work of reconciliation.  More information 
is available online at http://www.greenpeace.org/canada/en/blog/Blogentry/greenpeace-to-
canadas-aboriginal-peoples-work/blog/53339/.  
101 
 
 
 
the NWT partners young people with older community members to patrol the land 
and water, monitoring changes in water quality, sediments and wildlife.   The Deh 
Sho K’ehondi program run by the Deh Cho First Nations is similar with an increased 
focus on using Dene language and culture to rebuild relationships with the land.249  I 
am particularly interested in the interconnection between language and traditional 
views of stewardship of the land.   The revitalization of the Dene language is 
potentially transformative for environmental stewardship as much of the Dene 
knowledge of the land is captured in their language.250   
 
Legislators should also look for ways to incorporate Dene environmental goals and 
environmental management strategies into legislation.   This has been done 
elsewhere.   The Resource Management Act in New Zealand requires that all 
decision-makers managing the use, development and protection of natural and 
physical resources under that Act must have particular regard to kaitiakitanga.    
Kaitiakitanga is a Maori term that references traditional environmental 
guardianship in accordance with Maori values.251  The Environmental Goals and 
Sustainable Prosperity Act (EGSPA) in Nova Scotia references Netukulimk as one of 
the guiding principles in managing the environment and the economy.   Netukulimk 
is a Mi’kmaq expression of environmental guardianship principles which focuses on 
the preservation of resources for future generations.252   Nova Scotia also very 
recently passed an updated Mineral Resources Act, which requires the Minister to 
                                                        
249 Jimmy Thompson, “Excellent results from NWT Indigenous guardians programs”, CBC  (05 
November 2016) available online at cbc.ca. 
250 Wab Kinew describes how physicists from American universities would engage in dialogue with 
Indigenous knowledge keepers from the Anisanaabe FN.  These dialogues were premised on the 
awareness that many Indigenous languages describe the natural world in terms of process, action 
and flux.   This view of the world reflected the reality posited by contemporary physics more closely 
than static, noun-based English.  See Wab Kinew, The Reason You Walk (Toronto: Penguin Books Inc., 
2015) at 115.   Kinew was referencing the Algonquian languages of southern Canada not the 
Athabascan languages in the Canadian north.  However, it demonstrates the importance of language 
in influencing our world view and suggests that Aboriginal languages may allow us to develop more 
fluid views of the environment which are more reflective of how ecosystems actually work.   
251 Resource Management Act 1999 (NZ),1991/69, Sections 2(1) and 7(a).  
252 Environmental Goals and Sustainable Prosperity Act, S.N.S. 2007, C7, s1, Section 3(d).  
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consider the principles and goals referred to EGSPA including the Mi’kmaq concept 
of Netukulimk when making a decision.253   
 
It is important to include Aboriginal environmental goals and environmental 
management strategies in legislation.  It gives these concepts legitimacy and ensures 
that they are part of the regional and national storyline.   It also creates legal rights 
because people exercising powers under those Acts become legally obligated to 
engage with those principles and strategies as part of their decision-making process. 
This may be an awkward due to uncertainty around what the term means and how 
it might properly be considered but it will evolve over time.   Because legislation is 
only part of the overall regulatory framework,  Aboriginal people might also 
consider the inclusion of Aboriginal environmental goals and environmental 
management strategies in other contractually binding instruments such as 
environmental agreements and impact benefit agreements.  Ni Hadi Yati, the 
contractually binding arrangement with De Beers for the Gahcho Kue Mine, has 
possibilities for encouraging this type of dynamism and further study of that 
program would be warranted.254 
 
The Government of the Northwest Territories has assumed control over lands and 
resources under devolution.   As a result, it will need to revise its legislation and 
could use that opportunity to include more references to Dene environmental goals 
and Dene environmental management strategies.  
 
The process of negotiated rule making and its application in the Mackenzie Valley 
may also be worth exploring.  Negotiated rule making allows a regulatory agency to 
work closely with the party being regulated and other stakeholders to design rules 
that carefully balanced the interests of diverse parties.  It is aimed at achieving 
consensus among parties on how a rule ought to be structured.   Advocates of 
negotiated rulemaking argue that it improves rule quality, reduces transaction costs 
                                                        
253 Mineral Resources Act, S.N.S. 2016, C3, Section 2(2). 
254 See Paragraph 4.2.4 
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and increases legitimacy.255   At least one study has also shown that the interaction 
between stakeholders in the process builds relationships and increases 
commitment to a successful result.256    
 
Negotiated rule making is beneficial to the extent that it encourages dialogue and 
understanding among participants as they attempt to resolve issues in a manner 
that is acceptable to all of their interests.  It has the potential to promote shared 
environmental goals and responsibilities among culturally diverse parties.   It also 
gives the Dene an increased voice in the regulatory process that is appropriate given 
their status as rightsholders.     The MVRMA boards have processes that are inclusive 
of Aboriginal peoples but negotiated rule making goes further and encourages the 
parties to look for solutions outside of prescribed administrative solutions and 
builds more immediate relationships between parties.   Negotiated rule making is 
also available to other regulators such as the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, or 
the GNWT.   Negotiated rule making would be a complimentary process to the 
regulatory process, and a strong regulator is a necessary component in the process 
to ensure that the solutions arrived at by the parties meet the requirements of 
effective environmental management. 
 
This might be the ultimate strength of the Mackenzie Valley regime – that it can 
build tools to incorporate the goals of sustainability and also to develop a shared 
vision that is broader, and more creative, and is respectful of the land and the inter-
relationship of those who live on the land from both a Dene and a westernized 
perspective. This is the principled vision that allows for a regulatory framework that 
is more flexible, creative and adaptive but which also delivers on environmental 
protection.    
 
                                                        
255 Jody Freeman and Laura I. Langbein, “Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit” (2000) 
9 N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal 60 at 60. 
256 Ibid. at 87. 
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The Mackenzie Valley regime serves as a model for what is possible elsewhere in the 
country and suggests that adaptive capacity may be enhanced not decreased with 
the multiplicity of instruments provided that there is principled flexibility – and that 
supporting and enabling Aboriginal people to exercise their traditional role in 
stewardship of the land is an important component in encouraging effective and 
resilient environmental management. 
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